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This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading)
and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure
are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. The eﬀect of combining the two
schemes is also discussed.
We ﬁnd that output and abatement costs are higher under credit trading. Combining
the two schemes may give an increase in welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading
always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading
may outperform permit trading.
Environmental policy can lead to both entry and exit of ﬁrms. Entry and exit have a
profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition.
We ﬁnd that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions.
Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level
of emissions.
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11 Introduction
In the economic literature, emissions trading is almost always equated with a system based on a
ceiling or cap on total emissions. In such a scheme, the government agency determines a cap on
total emissions and divides this into permits that are distributed among the incumbent ﬁrms,
after which the ﬁrms are allowed to trade the permits. The ﬁrst large-scale application of such
a scheme was the US SO2 trading scheme that started in 1995 (see Schmalensee et al. 1998).
Currently, the largest cap-and-trade system is the EU greenhouse gas emissions allowances
trading scheme that started on 1 January 2005 (DIR 2003/87/EC ).
Before cap-and-trade, or permit trading, schemes had started, another type of emissions
trading had been developed in the US and formalized in the EPA emissions trading program.
This system is based on a relative emission standard that sets a maximum level of emissions
per unit of some input or output. Firms that succeed in keeping their emissions below the level
required by the emission standard receive emission reduction credits. They can sell them to other
ﬁrms that are then allowed to emit more than the level deﬁned by the emission standard. The
lead trading program in the US is one example of emissions trading based on relative standards
(see Svendsen 1998). In 1982, the US Environmental Protection Agency limited the lead content
in gasoline to 1.1 gram per gallon and tightened the standard in following years to 0.1 gram in
1986. Reﬁneries that remained below the standard could sell credits to other reﬁneries. Another
example is the Dutch NOx emissions trading scheme that started on 1 June 2005 (Ministry
of VROM 2004a,b). In this scheme, a distinction is made between combustion and process
installations. The former emit NOx as a result of the combustion of fuels. The standard for
these installations is based on the amount of NOx per gigajoule (GJ) of fuel used, decreasing
from 68 gram/GJ in 2005 to 40 g/GJ in 2010. Hence, combustion installations face a relative
input standard. Process installations however are regulated through a relative output standard
determined as allowed NOx emissions per unit of output that diﬀers per process. Again, ﬁrms
that remain below the standard are allowed to sell credits.
In the following, emissions trading based on a cap on emissions will be denoted by permit
trading, while emissions trading based on relative output standards will be denoted as credit
trading. It is very well possible for permit and credit trading to be combined, both at the national
and at the international level. The UK greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, started in 2002,
already combines both systems (DETR 2001). In the Netherlands, a CO2 emissions trading
scheme was proposed where the energy-intensive exporting sectors were regulated though a
credit trading scheme, while the remaining sectors were regulated through permit trading (CO2
Trading Commission 2002). The European Commission has chosen to apply a cap-and-trade
system from January 2005, so that a combination of permit and credit trading for greenhouse
gases should not be possible within the EU anymore. However, several countries and especially
US states have expressed an interest to join the EU scheme. If these jurisdictions set up a
domestic credit trading scheme, combined trading between them and the EU would occur.
The aim of this paper is to give an insight into the functioning of and the diﬀerences between
2permit and credit trading and into the implications of combing the two schemes. To this end, a
partial equilibrium model of a polluting industry is developed. Two types of market structure
are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. In both cases, the number of ﬁrms
is endogenous in the long run. To enable a comparison between the instruments, it is assumed
throughout the paper that the government has imposed a ceiling on total industry emissions.
Credit trading is based on relative standards and therefore shares many characteristics with
the latter instrument. This is especially the case when the industry is homogeneous since then
there will be no trade in emissions. Ebert (1998, 1999) analyzes relative standards under perfect
competition and Cournot oligopoly, but his analysis is limited to the short run where the number
of ﬁrms is given.1 In addition, Ebert (1998, 1999) assumes that a ﬁrm’s cost function is additively
separable in production and abatement cost. We will work with a more general cost function.
Dijkstra (1999) analyzes relative and absolute standards, emission taxation and permit trading
in the short run and in the long run, but only for perfect competition. The conclusions from
this literature are that relative standards lead to higher industry output and higher marginal
abatement costs than absolute emission ceilings and permit trading. Furthermore, Dijkstra
(1999) shows that in the long run, production per ﬁrm is lower and the total number of ﬁrms is
higher under relative standards than under permit trading.
Boom (2001) was the ﬁrst to give credit trading some thought. His analysis shows that output
will be larger under credit trading than under permit trading (see also Boom and Nentjes 2003).
Fischer discusses several instruments, one of which is credit trading, under perfect (Fischer,
2001) and imperfect (Fischer 2003b) competition. She shows that credit trading can be seen as
a tax on emissions equal to the credit price combined with a subsidy per unit of output equal to
the average value of emissions embodied in output (credit price times the relative standard times
output). Because of this, output under perfect competition will be larger than optimal. The
socially optimal pollution level is achieved with a strict standard that results in a credit price
above the Pigouvian tax rate. Fischer (2001, 2003b) assumes constant marginal production costs
(decreasing in the emissions-to-output ratio). She only analyzes the short-run eﬀects, given the
number of ﬁrms. Fischer (2003b) assumes that with imperfect competition a ﬁrm realizes that
when it increases its output, the government will tighten the relative standard. We will take
this eﬀect into account in the long run only.
Fischer (2003a) discusses the eﬀect of combining permit and credit trading for two perfectly
competitive sectors. She concludes that such a combination always leads to higher total emis-
sions. However, this conclusion is based on the assumption that governments will not set a
stricter relative standard in the credit sector.
The existing literature has already given some insight in the diﬀerences between permit and
credit trading. This chapter adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, it gives a more
formal analysis of the impacts of the two schemes and analyzes the long-run impacts on industry
structure. Second, the paper gives a full analysis of the performance of the two schemes under
1Helfand (1991) analyzes several forms of standards, including relative standards, keeping the product price
constant. However, diﬀerent standards will typically result in diﬀerent product prices.
3imperfect competition. Diﬀerent from other studies on environmental policy under imperfect
competition, entry and exit is endogenous in our model. Modeling imperfect competition in this
way leads to rather diﬀerent results than when the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed. Furthermore, we
analyze the eﬀects of combining permit and credit trading formally, showing that this may both
decrease or increase welfare.
Another issue often ignored is that the number of ﬁrms must be an integer. In our general
model of perfect competition we will ignore this integer constraint as well. One might conjecture
that this is rather harmless, because the number of ﬁrms is very large (Dijkstra 1999, p. 91,
fn 14). In our simulation with a speciﬁc model, we will examine the consequences of the inte-
ger constraint. The integer constraint has particulary dramatic consequences under imperfect
competition. We ﬁnd that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry
emissions with permit or credit trading. It can also occur that there are multiple levels of the
relative standard that achieve the same level of industry emissions.
The analysis consists of two parts. In the next section, we develop a partial equilibrium
model. Here, both the short-run and long-run consequences of the two types of emissions trading
are discussed and the eﬀects on ﬁrm and total production, abatement costs, numbers of ﬁrms
in the industry and welfare are given. Furthermore, an analysis of combined trading is given in
section 2.4. However, some issues remain unresolved in the general model. Therefore, and to
illustrate the properties of the two schemes, we run simulations with a more speciﬁc model in
section 3. Finally, section 4 gives some conclusions.
2A G e n e r a l M o d e l
In this section, a general model of permit and credit trading is developed, which will be used
to analyze the cases of perfect and imperfect competition. In all cases, it is assumed that the
government wants to regulate an industry’s emissions of a pollutant so that the total level does
not exceed the limit L. The industry consists of n>1 identical ﬁrms. Costs of production for a
single ﬁrm are given by C(q,E), where q gives the level of output and E the level of emissions.
The properties of the cost function are Cq > 0, Cqq ≥ 0, CqE ≤ 0, CE < 0a n dCEE ≥ 0. Inverse




With perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms in the market is large and no single ﬁrm has
an inﬂuence on the product or emissions quota price. In this section, we ignore the integer
constraint on the number of ﬁrms. We will ﬁrst analyze optimal ﬁrm behavior in the short run
and then discuss the eﬀects on the industry in the long run.
Short run. In the short run entry and exit do not take place. Therefore, the number of ﬁrms in
the sector is given. Because of this, it is possible that ﬁrms will receive a proﬁt, or incur losses
4in the short run.
With permit trading, each incumbent ﬁrm receives an initial amount of permits ¯ E. The
price of permits that arises in the market is denoted by Rp. The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is
then given by
π = pq − C(q,E) − Rp(E − ¯ E)
The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts, which results in the following ﬁrst order conditions
∂π
∂q
= p − Cq =0 ( 1 )
∂π
∂E
= −CE − Rp =0 ( 2 )
The ﬁrst condition says that marginal revenue, in this case price, should be equated with mar-
ginal costs of production. Since CqE < 0, regulation results in an increase in production costs
and therefore an increase in the product price. The proﬁt-maximizing emission level is found
by equating the marginal costs of emissions to the price of permits. Condition (2) ensures that
marginal abatement costs are equalized between ﬁrms.
With credit trading, the scheme is based on a limit on emissions per unit of output. Let this
relative standard be given by ¯ e. Total allowed emissions for the ﬁrm is then ¯ eq plus or minus
the number of credits bought or sold respectively. Under these conditions, proﬁts for the ﬁrm
are given by
π = pq − C(q,E) − Rc(E − ¯ eq)
where Rc is the market price for credits. The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p − Cq + Rc¯ e =0 ( 3 )
∂π
∂E
= −CE − Rc =0 ( 4 )
These can be combined to give
p = Cq +¯ eCE (5)
Since (4) holds for all ﬁrms, marginal abatement costs will be equalized between ﬁrms. Hence,
credit trading achieves an eﬃcient distribution of the abatement burden across ﬁrms. However,
as a comparison between (3) and (1) shows, the production levels under the two schemes will
not be identical. With credit trading, the term Rc¯ e makes that ﬁrms no longer equate marginal
production costs to the price of the product, but to a lower level, indicating that in equilibrium
total output will be higher and the product price lower under credit trading. The additional
factor can be seen as an output subsidy (Fischer (2001)) since the ﬁrm is allowed to emit more
when it produces more.
It is now possible to determine the diﬀerence in impact of the two schemes in the short run:
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition and in the short run, and with equal total emissions,
5credit trading will lead to higher total and ﬁrm output (Qc >Q p, qc >q p) and to a higher
emission quota price (Rc >R p) than permit trading.
Proof: In the short run, nc = np = n.S i n c eLc = Lp = L,w eh a v et h a tEc = Ep. Furthermore,
from (1) and (5) it follows that Qc >Q p. This combined with nc = np = n gives qc >q p. The
fact that qc >q p combined with Ec = Ep gives Rc >R p since CEq < 0. 
Long Run In the long run, the number of ﬁrms is variable. Firms remaining in the industry
have zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
For permit trading, this implies that the long-run equilibrium conditions are
p = Cq (6)
pq = C(q,E)+RpE (7)
−CE = Rp (8)
nE = L (9)
Note that the permits ¯ E grandfathered to the ﬁrms do not appear in the zero-proﬁt condition
(7). The reason is that the permits represent an opportunity cost to the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm does
not cover its opportunity costs of emission, it would be better oﬀ if it sold its permits and closed
production.
The long-run conditions for credit trading are
p = Cq +¯ eCE (10)
pq = C(q,E) (11)
−CE = Rc (12)
nE = L (13)
Contrary to the permit trading scheme, a ﬁrm that stops producing does not receive any credits
and can therefore not sell them to other ﬁrms remaining in the industry. Thus under credit
trading, a ﬁrm only needs to cover its operating cost C(q,E) (equation (11)). Condition (13)
together with the assumption that ﬁrms are identical implies that E =¯ eq. As a ﬁnal condition
for both schemes, the inverse demand function is given by
p = p(nq) (14)
We can now show the following:
Proposition 2 Under perfect competition and in the long run with equal industry emissions,
credit trading leads to higher industry output (Qc >Q p), a higher emission quota price (Rc >
Rp), lower ﬁrm output (qc <q p), lower ﬁrm emissions (Ec <E p) and a larger number of ﬁrms
in the industry (nc >n p) than under permit trading.
6Proof: For permit as well as credit trading, we ﬁnd from (6) and (7), and (10) and (11)
respectively, that production is determined by
C(q,E)=qCq − RE (15)
Suppose that pc >p p. Then









From (15) it follows that (q,E) follows the same path for the two schemes, but at a diﬀerent
speed. Furthermore, E/q must decline as L declines from a non-binding level to zero. So from
(16) it follows that (Ep,qp) is ahead of (Ec,qc). Then from dE/dL,dq/dL > 0 (see appendix










But we had assumed
C(qc,Ec)
qc = pc >p p >
C(qp,Ep)
qp
This shows that pc >p p is impossible, so that we must have pc <p p.













Equation (15) implies that if Rc = Rp, output and emissions and hence E/q per ﬁrm are identical
under the two schemes. Then from (17) and dR/dL > 0, it follows that Rc >R p. From this
and (15) it then follows that Ec <E p and qc <q p. Furthermore, from Qc >Q p and qc <q p it
follows that nc >n p. 
This shows that the long-run eﬀects are rather diﬀerent from the short-run eﬀects. In the
short run, output per ﬁrm is higher under credit trading than under permit trading, while
emissions per ﬁrm are equal under the two schemes. In the long run, both output and emissions
per ﬁrm are lower under credit trading than under permit trading. On the other hand, an
important similarity between the short and long run is that abatement costs per unit of output
are higher under credit trading than under permit trading.
In appendix A, the eﬀect of a change in the total emissions limit L on product price, output,
emissions per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms is derived. For both permit and credit trading we
ﬁnd dq/dL > 0, dE/dL > 0a n ddp/dL ≤ 0. The introduction of emissions trading, starting
from a position without emission control policy, will result in a decrease in production per ﬁrm, a
decrease in emissions per ﬁrm and an increase in the price of the product. The latter also implies
that total output will be lower. For both schemes, it remains unclear whether the number of
7ﬁrms increases or decreases as a result of regulation. The outcome depends on the cost function
and on the slope of the demand function. We shall explore this issue in more detail in our
simulations in Section 3.
2.2 Imperfect Competition
With imperfect competition, each ﬁrm has an inﬂuence on the market price of the product. We
will assume Cournot competition between the ﬁrms. The emission trading scheme is conﬁned
to the sector analyzed, which implies that ﬁrms should also have market power on the emissions
quota market. In such a market, ﬁrms will bargain with each other over the price. The outcome
is dependent on the market power of the individual ﬁrms and the initial distribution of emission
quotas over the participants in the quota market. A complicating factor is that incumbent ﬁrms
may form a cartel, refusing to sell emission quotas to new entrants, thereby eﬀectively deter-
ring entry if emissions are necessary for production. The existence of an eﬀective competition
authority could prevent such behavior, however. In order not to complicate the analysis more
than necessary and to keep focus on the main issue of the paper, it is assumed that ﬁrms cannot
eﬀectively deter entry. Furthermore, it is assumed that the outcome of bargaining between ﬁrms
is the perfectly competitive emission quota price.
Short run. With imperfect competition and permit trading, the proﬁt function for a ﬁrm is:
π = p(Q)q − C(q,E) − Rp(E − ¯ E)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are:
∂π
∂q
= p q + p − Cq = 0 (18)
∂π
∂E
= −CE − Rp = 0 (19)
These conditions imply that the ﬁrm equates marginal revenue with marginal production costs
and marginal costs of abatement with the price of permits.
We would like to ensure that the equilibrium is stable. To this end, we determine the slope





qp   + p 




j=1,j =i qj. The denominator is negative by the second order condition (see
appendix B), and so we need the numerator to be negative as well to assure that the Nash
equilibrium is stable. In the following we shall assume that this is the case. In fact, we shall
assume that the stricter condition:
nqp   +2 p  < 0 (21)
8is satisﬁed. This also guarantees that the denominator on the RHS of (20) is negative.
When regulation takes the form of credit trading, the proﬁt function becomes
π = p(Q)q − C(q,E) − Rc(E − ¯ eq)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p q + p − Cq + Rc¯ e = 0 (22)
∂π
∂E
= −CE − Rc = 0 (23)
It is clear that the short-run ﬁrst order conditions for imperfect competition closely resemble
those for perfect competition. The only diﬀerence is that under imperfect competition ﬁrms
take the eﬀect of changes in their own output on the price of the product into account.





qp   + p 
qp   +2 p  − Cqq − ¯ eCEq
< 0
The nominator is negative by (21) and the denominator is negative by the second order condition
(see appendix B).
The relative impact of the two schemes in the short run is given by
Proposition 3 Under imperfect competition and in the short run, credit trading will lead higher
total and ﬁrm output (Qc >Q p, qc >q p) and to a higher emission quota price (Rc >R p) than
under permit trading. Firm emissions are identical under the two schemes (Ec = Ep).
Proof:S e eP r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . 
Hence, the short-run eﬀects of the two schemes under imperfect competition are basically
the same as under perfect competition.
Long Run. In the long run the number of ﬁrms can vary through entry and exit. More precisely,
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms will be such that if one more ﬁrm entered the market, all ﬁrms
would make a loss. That is, n∗ is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms with:
π(n∗) ≥ 0, and π(n∗ +1 )< 0 (24)
With permit trading, the long run proﬁt function becomes:
π = p(Q)q − C(q,E) − RpE (25)
9The long-run conditions for permit trading with imperfect competition are then:
p q + p = Cq
−CE = Rp
nE = L
and (24). The resulting equilibrium is stable as the slope of the reaction function is still given
by (20).
With credit trading, the ﬁrm knows that its actions will have an inﬂuence on the standard
set. Speciﬁcally, when a ﬁrm increases its output, total industry output increases and therefore
the government will set a stricter standard in order to keep industry emissions constant. Recall
from above that the standard is ¯ e = L
Q. The proﬁt function with credit trading can then be
rewritten as:







The long-run conditions for proﬁt maximization then become:










and (24). From a comparison of (26) with (22), it is clear that in the long run, ﬁrms have
less incentive to expand production since they know that an increase in output will lead to a
tightening of the relative standard. With monopoly Q = q, and (26) becomes p q + p = Cq.
The monopolist completely internalizes the tightening of the standard following an increase in
output. In this case, there is no diﬀerence between a credit and a permit trading scheme. More
generally: with an equal number of ﬁrms under both types of regulation, the lower the number
of ﬁrms in the market, the more closely the outcomes under credit and permit trading resemble
each other.
Compared with the short run, the ﬁrm no longer takes the relative standard as given. There-
















The denominator and numerator are negative by (21), so that the Nash equilibrium is stable.
For the relative impact of the two schemes in the long run we ﬁnd:
Proposition 4 In the long run under imperfect competition, the number of ﬁrms under credit
trading will be equal or larger than under permit trading (nc ≥ np). Then,
101. If nc = np, credit trading will lead to higher total and ﬁrm output (Qc >Q p, qc >q p)
identical ﬁrm emissions (Ec = Ep) and to a higher emission quota price (Rc >R p) than
under permit trading.
2. If nc >n p, credit trading leads to higher total output (Qc >Q p) and lower ﬁrm emissions
(Ec <E p).
Proof: Assume that nc = np. From the proﬁt functions and (18) and (22) it then follows that
under both permit and credit trading proﬁts can be written as
π = qCq + ECE − p q2 − C(q,E)
Diﬀerentiating partially with respect to q yields:
∂π
∂q
= qCqq + ECqE − q(2p  + nqp  ) > 0
The inequality follows from (21) and (60). Since qc >q p from (18) and (26) when nc = np,
it also follows that πc >π p when nc = np. This shows that there is a greater possibility for
entry under credit trading than under permit trading and hence, that nc ≥ np.I nP a r t1 ) ,s i n c e
nc = np and Lc = Lp, it follows that Ec = Ep. Furthermore, as we have seen above, it is clear
that Qc >Q p. This combined with nc = np gives qc >q p. The fact that qc >q p combined
with Ec = Ep gives Rc >R p since CEq < 0. In Part 2), Qc >Q p follows from dp/dn < 0( s e e
appendix B). Ec <E p follows immediately from nc >n p and Lc = Lp. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the relationship between qc and qp and that
between Rc and Rp for nc >n p. As is clear from the analysis in appendix B, for both schemes,
q decreases as the number of ﬁrms increases. However it is not clear whether qc is larger or
smaller than qp. For the emission quota price, the result of an increase in the number of ﬁrms
is ambiguous. Therefore, we cannot say whether the credit price will be larger or smaller than
the permit price.
For a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, we can determine what the eﬀect of a change in L is on most
other variables and thereby the eﬀect of introducing regulation. In appendix B, it is shown
that dq/dE > 0, dp/dE < 0 for both schemes, and dRp/dEp < 0 for permit trading. For
credit trading, the expression for dRc/dEc is ambiguous. However, when regulation goes from
non-binding to binding, dRc/dEc < 0. Thus, the introduction of emission trading, starting from
a position without regulation, will always lead to lower ﬁrm and total output and to higher
marginal abatement costs. When entry or exit takes place we cannot analyze the eﬀect of a
change in L because the number of ﬁrms changes discretely which will have a large eﬀect on the
other variables.
We have assumed in this paper that the goal of environmental policy is to achieve a certain
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Figure 1: Some L not obtainable with PT
however, whether environmental policy always can achieve the emission limit set.
Proposition 5 In a permit trading scheme, when the number of ﬁrms nP is increasing in the
amount L of permits issued, it may be impossible to achieve certain levels of total industry
emissions.
Figure 1 which shows the relation between the total amount L of permits issued and industry
emissions nE, illustrates this Proposition. For L ≥ L∗, there are n∗ ﬁrms in the industry and
emissions are equal to the limit: n∗E = L. However, proﬁts are decreasing as the government
issues less and less permits. For L<L ∗, only n∗ − 1 ﬁrms can survive in the industry. As long
as L ≥ ¯ L, these n∗ − 1 ﬁrms can emit as much as they like without exceeding the total limit
for the industry. This is because the ﬁrms only want to emit ¯ L between them. There will be an
excess supply of permits, so that the permit price is zero. As a result, industry emission levels
between ¯ L and L∗ cannot be attained. We will see an example of this in Section 3.2, Table 10.
Proposition 6 In a credit trading scheme
i) If nc is increasing in ¯ e,s o m eL cannot be realized.
ii) If nc is decreasing in ¯ e,s o m eL can be realized with more than one ¯ e.
Proof:i ) I f¯ e remains the same, and nc decreases, it is shown in appendix B that total
output decreases as well. Since
n
i=1 Ei =¯ eQ, it follows that total emissions also decrease
discretely. It then follows that certain L cannot be realized. ii) If at ﬁxed ¯ e the number of ﬁrms
increases, total output increases (see appendix B) and thereby total emissions. Hence, at the
¯ e where nc increases, total emissions increase, whereafter they decrease as ¯ e decreases. It then
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Figure 3: Some L obtainable with diﬀerent ¯ e
Figure 2 illustrates the case where the government cannot reach certain L under credit
trading. For ¯ e>e ∗, there are n∗ ﬁrms in the industry. However, proﬁts decrease as the relative
standard is tightened. When ¯ e<e ∗, there is only room for n∗ − 1 ﬁrms in the industry. As
the number of ﬁrms drops at e∗, so do total emissions: from L∗ ≡ e∗n∗ to ˜ L ≡ e∗(n∗ − 1) in
Figure 2. Industry emission levels between ˜ L and L∗ cannot be achieved with credit trading.
An example of this is given in Table 11 of Section 3.2.
Figure 3 illustrates the case where the same level of industry emissions can be achieved with
diﬀerent levels of the relative standard. For ¯ e>e ∗, there are n∗ ﬁrms in the industry. Now
proﬁts increase as the relative standard is tightened. When ¯ e<e ∗, there is room for n∗ +1
ﬁrms in the industry. As the number of ﬁrms rises e∗, so do total emissions: from L∗ ≡ e∗n∗
to ˜ L ≡ e∗(n∗ + 1) in Figure 3. This implies that any industry emission level between ˜ L and
L∗ can be achieved with two levels of the relative standard. Total emissions ¯ L, for instance,
can be achieved with a relative standard of e0, resulting in n∗ + 1 ﬁrms in the industry (where
e0 = ¯ L/[n∗ +1]) and with a relative standard of e1, resulting in n∗ ﬁrms (where e1 = ¯ L/n∗). To
maximize welfare, the government should choose the stricter relative standard e0. This standard
leads to the highest number of ﬁrms, which increases total output and diminishes market power.
Table 13 in Section 3.2 provides an example of this.
2.3 Welfare
The emission trading schemes described above will have diﬀerent impacts on welfare. To compare
the performance of the two instruments, we assume that they are set such as to give the same
amount of total emissions L. Here, welfare is given by consumer plus producer surplus. This is





p(Y )dY − nC(q,E) − λ(nE − L) (27)
In the short run, only production is variable, while the number of ﬁrms n and the total ceiling
on emissions L are ﬁxed. The latter two imply that E and λ are ﬁxed. Maximizing (27) with
respect to q gives as the short run ﬁrst order condition:
p = Cq (28)
In the long-run, all variables can change. Therefore, to ﬁnd the optimum, we must maximize




This enables us to state the following for perfect competition:
Proposition 7 Under perfect competition, only permit trading leads to optimal welfare, while
credit trading leads to lower short-run and long-run welfare.
Proof: Comparing (28) with (1) (5) for the short run, and (29) with (6)-(9) and (10)-(13)
for the long run, it follows immediately that permit trading fulﬁlls all optimality conditions for
welfare while credit trading does not. 
This result may seem somewhat odd since credit trading leads to higher output and thereby
to a larger consumer surplus. Since proﬁts are zero under both instruments, one might derive
from this that credit trading would lead to higher welfare. There are however two other eﬀects
that have to be taken into account. First, costs of production are higher under credit trading.
Credit trading is an ineﬃcient instrument because it limits the options for reducing emissions.
One eﬀective way to reduce emissions is by reducing output. However, under credit trading,
this option will not be utilized to its maximum because reducing output also reduces the total
allowable amount of emissions for the ﬁrm. Second, under permit trading, the ﬁrm has to cover
the opportunity cost of its emissions, which is not the case under credit trading. This is a cost to
the ﬁrm, but it is a resource rent reaped by the shareholders. Under credit trading, the resource
r e n ti sc o m p e t e da w a y .
With imperfect competition, it is not immediately clear which instrument leads to highest
welfare. There are three eﬀects that have to be taken into account. In general, imperfect
competition leads to lower than optimal production. As we have seen above, credit trading
leads to higher output than permit trading and therefore seems to have an advantage. Credit
trading also results in more (at least not less) ﬁrms in the sector. This means that under
credit trading ﬁrms have less market power, which again leads to a higher output level than
under permit trading. However, credit trading also leads to higher abatement costs than permit
14trading. The overall eﬀect depends on the size of the three eﬀects.
2.4 Combining Permit and Credit Trading
When permit and credit trading are combined, emission quotas will ﬂow from the sector with the
lowest to the sector with the highest quota price. For simplicity, we will focus on the case where
two sectors are identical in every respect, except that they operate on two diﬀerent markets
(with identical demand functions) and that one sector is regulated through permit trading while
the other is regulated through credit trading. As was shown above, under perfect competition
and under imperfect competition with nc = np, the credit price is always higher than the permit
price so that permits will ﬂow to the credit sector. However, with imperfect competition and
nc >n p, this need not be the case so that here credits may ﬂow to the permit sector.
Irrespective of the direction in which credits ﬂow, the eﬀect of combining the two systems is
that the sector selling emission quotas will reduce production and the product price will increase.
The buying sector will expand production and the product price in this sector will fall. Thus
combined trading stimulates output of the sector which initially had the highest emission quota
price at the expense of output in the other sector.
Proposition 8 Assume two perfectly competitive industries that are identical in every respect,
except that they produce diﬀerent products. One industry is regulated through permit trading and
the other through credit trading. Allowing emissions trading between the two sectors will lead to
an identical emissions quota price (Rc = Rp = R), the permit sector selling quotas to the credit
sector, and
1. in the short run, to a decrease in output per ﬁrm and an increase in product price in the
permit sector. In the credit sector, ﬁrm output will increase and product price will decrease.
Furthermore, it will lead to higher ﬁrm emissions and output (Ec >E p and qc >q p)a n d
lower product price (pc <p p) in the credit sector than in the permit sector.
2. in the long run to a decrease in output and emissions per ﬁrm and an increase in the
product price in the permit sector. In the credit sector, the product price will decrease,
while ﬁrm emissions and output may increase or decrease. In both sectors, the number of
ﬁrms may increase or decrease. Furthermore, combined trading will lead to identical ﬁrm
emissions (Ec = Ep), identical ﬁrm output (qc = qp), a higher number of ﬁrms (nc >n p),
and a lower product price (pc <p p) in the credit sector than in the permit sector.
Proof. Combining the two schemes will give Rc = Rp = R since the quota market is perfectly
competitive. Since Rc >R p in the short run (Proposition 1) as well as in the long run (Propo-
sition 2), the quota price will decrease for the credit sector and increase for the permit sector.
As a result, the permit sector sells quotas to the credit sector. Then
1. In the short run, combining the schemes leads to a decrease in Ep and an increase in Ec. In
appendix A, it is shown that dqp/dEp > 0, dpp/dEp < 0, dqc/dEc > 0a n ddpc/dEc < 0.
15Thus, combined trading results in a decrease in qp and pc and an increase in pp and qc.
Since separate schemes already feature qc >q p and pc <p p, the same inequalities hold for
combined trading.
2. In the long run, combining the schemes leads to a decrease in Lp and an increase in Lc.
In appendix A, it is shown that dqp/dL > 0, dEp/dL > 0, dpp/dL < 0a n ddpc/dL < 0
while the signs of dnp/dL, dqc/dL, dEc/dL and dnc/dL are ambiguous. From (15) it
follows that q and E follow the same path with permit and credit trading. Combined with
Rc = Rp = R, this means that Ec = EP and qc = qP. From (6) and (10) we ﬁnd that
pc <p p. Combining this with qc = qp, it is clear that nc >n p must hold. 
With imperfect competition and nc >n p, we could not state whether the credit price was
higher or lower than the permit price. Therefore we can only state a result for the case where
nc = np:
Proposition 9 Assume two imperfectly competitive industries that are identical in every re-
spect, except that they produce diﬀerent products. One industry is regulated through permit
trading and the other through credit trading. Assume furthermore that the outcome in the emis-
sions quota market is the perfectly competitive quota price so that Rc = Rp = R. Then, under
combined trading, in the short run and in the long run with nc = np, the permit sector sells
quotas to the credit sector, resulting in Ec >E p. In the permit sector ﬁrm output will decrease
and product price will decrease, while in the credit sector, ﬁrm output will increase and product
price will decrease. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that Ec >E p, qc >q p and pc <p p.
Proof:W i t h nc = np under separate schemes, Rc >R P (Propositions 3 and 4). Combined
trading then leads to an increase in Ec and a decrease in Ep. As is shown in appendix B, for
both the short and long run, dq/dE > 0a n ddp/dE < 0 for both schemes. Since with separate
schemes we had qc >q p and pc <p p, the result follows immediately. 
2.4.1 Welfare
It follows directly from Proposition 7 that a system where one sector is regulated through permit
trading and the other through credit trading is not welfare maximizing. However, this does not
immediately show what happens to welfare when a permit and credit sector are allowed to trade.
This is shown formally below, both for the short and the long run for perfect competition and
for the case where nc = np under imperfect competition.
The eﬀect of combining the two schemes on total welfare can be analyzed by determining
the change in welfare as a result of a change in the division of the emission ceiling over the two








16with the total emission limit given by:
ncEc + npEp = Lc + Lp = S (30)





We know from Propositions 8 and 9 that combined trading leads to an increase in Ec. Diﬀer-
entiating welfare with respect to Ec, while holding nc and np constant, and using (31) gives for
the short run:
dW
dEc = ncpc dqc
dEc − ncCqc
dqc
dEc − ncCEc − ncpp dqp
dEp + ncCqp
dqp
dEp + ncCEp (32)
In the long run, the number of ﬁrms can change, and from (30) we ﬁnd that dLp/dLc = −1.
The change in welfare is then given by:
dW
dLc = qcpcdnc





























For the long run, (33) can be rewritten using (6), (7), (10) and (11) and noting that Ec =¯ eqc
and E dn
dL + ndE













There are two eﬀects. First, abatement costs increase in the permit sector and decrease in
the credit sector (the term between square brackets on the RHS of (34) and (35)). Since
initially marginal abatement costs are higher in the credit sector, this leads to a welfare increase.
Secondly, production increases in the credit sector and decreases in the permit sector. In itself,
the production change in the permit sector is not distortionary, because output is optimal, given
total emissions. In the credit sector, however, output is larger than optimal, and the gap between
actual and optimal output increases when the two sectors are combined. This eﬀect is given by
the second term on the RHS of (34) and (35) and causes a decrease in welfare. The total eﬀect
on welfare then depends on the size of these two eﬀects. If marginal abatement costs are much
higher in the credit sector, while the output eﬀect is not very large, combining the two schemes
will lead to an increase in welfare.




[CEp − CEc]+pp qp dqp




Again there are two eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is the same as with perfect competition. Abatement
costs increase in the permit sector and decrease in the credit sector as a result of the transfer
of permits to the credit sector. The second eﬀect is the output eﬀect. Production in the credit
sector increases, while it decreases in the permit sector. This leads to a loss in the permit sector
equal to ncpp qp dqp
dEp. In the credit sector, the eﬀect is depends on whether output is above or
below the welfare optimum given by p = Cq. Hence under imperfect competition, an increase





dEp. That is, combining the two schemes is more likely to lead to an increase in
welfare when the inverse demand function is concave and output in the credit sector increases
more than it decreases in the permit sector.
For imperfect competition, we cannot show the long-run eﬀect of combining the two schemes
on welfare when nc >n p. The problem is that it is hard to determine when entry or exit will
take place and a change in the number of ﬁrms will have a large impact on the results.
3 Simulation
The analysis above leaves many questions open. Under perfect competition, the eﬀects of com-
bined trading on the number of ﬁrms and welfare are still not fully clear. Moreover, the size
of the eﬀects discussed above is unknown. Recall also that in the analysis above we ignored
the constraint that the number of ﬁrms under perfect competition is an integer Furthermore,
the outcome under imperfect competition is not entirely clear, especially in the long run when
nc >n p. To analyze these problems, we will deploy a more speciﬁc model. Numerical simulations
will then be used to generate several scenarios.
For the simulation, we will use the following cost function:
C(q,E)=aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K a,b,K>0 (36)
Here, a and b are parameters and K gives ﬁxed costs. It can easily be veriﬁed that this cost
function satisﬁes all ﬁrst and second order conditions stated in this paper for the general function.
Furthermore, the inverse demand function is linear and is given by
p(nq)=α − βnq α,β > 0 (37)
The solutions of the simulation model are given in appendix C.
183.1 Perfect Competition
The general analysis in Section 2 already provided a thorough insight into the workings of the
two schemes under perfect competition. The only question unanswered in that part was how
the number of ﬁrms in the sector changes as it becomes regulated. We will therefore analyze
this long run eﬀect here in some detail. Furthermore, we will discuss the eﬀect of a change
in emission reduction targets, marginal abatement costs and demand function on the regulated
sector.
The simulation results for perfect competition are given in Tables 1 to 6. All examples are
constructed such that without regulation, ﬁrm output and emissions are 1, the number of ﬁrms
is 100 and product price is 2. In Tables 1 to 3 the eﬀect of a change in b in the cost function
(36) is given for an emissions reduction level of 30%. In Tables 4 to 6, b is kept constant at 1,
but the emission reduction level is varied between 10 and 100%. For each case, change in b or
in L, there are three subcases. The three subcases diﬀer from each other in that the demand
function becomes more elastic.
In the model used for the simulations the number of ﬁrms is an integer. This diﬀers from the
model used in Section 2.1 where the number of ﬁrms does not have to be an integer and typically
is not. This has several implications for the results. The main diﬀerence with the general model
is that in the simulations, long-run proﬁts may be positive. Firms will then not produce in their
lowest average cost position, but at a larger output level. The results from Section 2.1 may now
no longer hold. The simulations provide several examples of these deviations from the theory
given in Section 2.1. In the following, we will ﬁrst discuss the results for the separate schemes
and after that those for combined trading.
In general, the simulation results conﬁrm the results of the general analysis given in Section
2.1. Any deviations are due to the integer constraint on the number of ﬁrms. Regulation leads
to lower industry output and higher product prices. In most cases production per ﬁrm is higher
under permit than under credit trading, but total production and the number of ﬁrms are higher
under credit trading. The Tables also show that in general, the credit price is higher than the
permit price. Note however that there are some irregularities in Table 4. For emission reductions
of 10, 20 and 90% the ﬁrm output level is higher under credit trading than under permit trading,
while the theoretical analysis showed that the reverse should be the case. Notice however also
that the number of ﬁrms is the same under both schemes. As we showed earlier, with an equal
number of ﬁrms, ﬁrm output must be higher under credit trading than under permit trading.
Furthermore, for emission reductions of 60, 70 and 80% the credit price is lower than the permit
price.
As mentioned, a question still left open by the general analysis is the eﬀect of regulation on
the number of ﬁrms. As is shown in Appendix A, the number of ﬁrms may increase or decrease
as a result of regulation, although credit trading always leads to a higher number of ﬁrms than
permit trading. A review of Tables 1 through 6 shows that the number of ﬁrms in the market
depends on the slope of the inverse demand function, and thereby the elasticity of demand,
19Table 1: Perfect Competition: Inelastic Demand 1
a =1 ,K =1 ,α = 102, β =1 ,q0 =1 ,n0 = 100, E0 =1 ,p0 =2 ,L =7 0
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
1 0.966 103 0.680 2.505 0.573 0.961 104 0.673 2.093 0.575
2 0.926 107 0.654 2.938 1.086 0.924 108 0.648 2.179 1.104
3 0.897 110 0.636 3.356 1.562 0.891 112 0.625 2.256 1.593
4 0.870 113 0.620 3.740 2.001 0.859 116 0.603 2.328 2.046
5 0.844 116 0.603 4.094 2.406 0.837 119 0.588 2.412 2.486
6 0.827 118 0.593 4.455 2.801 0.809 123 0.569 2.473 2.881
7 0.804 121 0.579 4.759 3.152 0.789 126 0.556 2.548 3.272
8 0.788 123 0.569 5.078 3.502 0.770 129 0.543 2.618 3.644
9 0.773 125 0.560 5.379 3.833 0.752 132 0.530 2.685 3.998
10 0.759 127 0.551 5.664 4.147 0.735 135 0.519 2.748 4.334
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
1 0.966 103 0.679 2.506 0.574 0.961 104 0.674 2.093
2 0.926 107 0.652 2.947 1.095 0.924 108 0.651 2.176
3 0.897 110 0.634 3.371 1.578 0.891 112 0.628 2.252
4 0.869 113 0.616 3.767 2.029 0.867 115 0.613 2.337
5 0.844 116 0.599 4.135 2.447 0.844 118 0.599 2.415
6 0.820 119 0.583 4.479 2.840 0.816 122 0.579 2.474
7 0.797 122 0.567 4.804 3.211 0.796 125 0.566 2.542
8 0.781 124 0.558 5.134 3.572 0.777 128 0.553 2.609
9 0.760 127 0.543 5.433 3.912 0.764 130 0.547 2.683
10 0.746 129 0.534 5.731 4.239 0.746 133 0.534 2.742
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 4991 4991 9983 4991 4991 9983
2 4983 4983 9966 4983 4983 9966
3 4976 4975 9950 4975 4975 9950
4 4968 4967 9936 4967 4968 9936
5 4961 4960 9921 4960 4962 9922
6 4955 4953 9908 4953 4955 9908
7 4949 4946 9895 4946 4949 9895
8 4943 4939 9882 4940 4942 9882
9 4937 4933 9870 4933 4937 9870
10 4931 4927 9858 4927 4931 9858
and on the marginal costs of abatement. In the cases given in Tables 1 and 4, the slope of
the demand function is −1 and the elasticity of demand without regulation is −0.02. Under
both permit and credit trading, the number of ﬁrms increases as compared with no regulation,
although more so with credit trading than with permit trading. However, as the slope of the
inverse demand function becomes ﬂatter and demand more elastic, the number of ﬁrms in both
sectors decreases as is clear from Tables 2 and 5 where the elasticity is −0.2 and Tables 3 and 6
where the elasticity is −2 under no regulation. The explanation for this is as follows. Regulation
increases the cost of production and thereby the price of the product. If demand is inelastic,
total output will not change much, while output will decrease by a large amount if demand is
elastic. At the same time, regulation decreases the optimal production level for the ﬁrm and
more so with credit trading than with permit trading. Then, when emissions are regulated, total
output does not decrease much with inelastic demand, while output per ﬁrm does decrease, so
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a =1 ,K =1 ,α = 12, β =0 .1, q0 =1 ,n0 = 100, E0 =1 ,p0 =2 ,L =7 0
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
1 0.973 98 0.714 2.464 0.518 0.962 103 0.680 2.090 0.565
2 0.948 97 0.722 2.803 0.906 0.928 106 0.660 2.164 1.070
3 0.938 95 0.737 3.086 1.209 0.904 108 0.648 2.241 1.533
4 0.934 93 0.753 3.316 1.449 0.875 111 0.631 2.293 1.951
5 0.933 91 0.769 3.507 1.641 0.854 113 0.620 2.351 2.344
6 0.936 89 0.787 3.668 1.796 0.835 115 0.609 2.403 2.710
7 0.933 88 0.796 3.790 1.924 0.822 116 0.603 2.461 3.065
8 0.941 86 0.814 3.910 2.028 0.805 118 0.593 2.501 3.388
9 0.941 85 0.824 4.000 2.118 0.789 120 0.583 2.538 3.693
10 0.943 84 0.833 4.079 2.193 0.778 121 0.579 2.582 3.996
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
1 0.963 99 0.693 2.467 0.541 0.971 102 0.700 2.100
2 0.941 97 0.695 2.869 0.986 0.945 104 0.698 2.173
3 0.925 95 0.698 3.211 1.361 0.922 106 0.695 2.229
4 0.913 93 0.703 3.508 1.682 0.908 107 0.698 2.286
5 0.904 91 0.708 3.771 1.962 0.902 107 0.706 2.344
6 0.899 89 0.715 4.003 2.206 0.898 107 0.714 2.394
7 0.895 87 0.723 4.211 2.420 0.894 107 0.721 2.436
8 0.894 85 0.731 4.397 2.608 0.890 107 0.727 2.473
9 0.887 84 0.733 4.550 2.776 0.887 107 0.733 2.504
10 0.890 82 0.743 4.705 2.926 0.892 106 0.746 2.544
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 492.3 491.6 983.9 491.5 492.4 983.9
2 486.6 484.1 970.7 484.1 486.9 971.0
3 482.2 477.6 959.7 477.5 482.7 960.2
4 478.7 471.4 950.2 471.5 479.8 951.2
5 476.0 465.9 941.9 466.0 477.8 943.8
6 473.8 460.8 934.6 461.0 476.4 937.4
7 471.9 456.4 928.3 456.4 475.5 931.9
8 470.4 451.9 922.3 452.2 474.8 927.1
9 469.1 447.7 916.8 448.4 474.5 922.9
10 468.0 444.1 912.1 444.9 474.6 919.4
that more ﬁrms can exist in the market. When demand is more elastic, total output decreases
more and fewer ﬁrms can survive in the market. At some point, demand decreases by so much
with an increase in price that the total number of ﬁrms decreases compared with no regulation.
It is interesting to see that in general the outcome depends on the elasticity of demand.
For example, the higher the elasticity of demand, the lower the emissions quota price, and the
larger the diﬀerence between the permit and credit price. With a high demand elasticity, a given
increase in price results in a relatively large decrease in output and thereby also in emissions.
Hence, the price of emissions does not need to be very high to achieve a given reduction in
emissions. Credit trading results in a smaller decrease in emissions for a given emissions quota
price because of the implicit output subsidy that is inherent in this system. The eﬀect of the
output subsidy will be larger, the larger the elasticity is. Hence, the credit price must be higher
than the permit price and the diﬀerence must be larger when demand is more elastic.
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a =1 ,K =1 ,α =3 ,β =0 .01, q0 =1 ,n0 = 100, E0 =1 ,p0 =2 ,L =7 0
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
1 0.996 79 0.886 2.213 0.220 0.972 96 0.729 2.066 0.487
2 0.998 75 0.933 2.252 0.257 0.957 94 0.745 2.101 0.848
3 1.003 73 0.959 2.268 0.263 0.944 93 0.753 2.122 1.150
4 1.005 72 0.972 2.276 0.265 0.937 92 0.761 2.138 1.408
5 1.000 72 0.972 2.280 0.280 0.933 91 0.769 2.151 1.634
6 1.008 71 0.986 2.284 0.268 0.931 90 0.778 2.162 1.834
7 1.006 71 0.986 2.286 0.275 0.924 90 0.778 2.169 2.040
8 1.003 71 0.986 2.288 0.281 0.924 89 0.787 2.177 2.205
9 1.002 71 0.986 2.289 0.285 0.919 89 0.787 2.182 2.385
10 1.000 71 0.986 2.290 0.289 0.922 88 0.796 2.189 2.524
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
1 0.991 72 0.839 2.287 0.305 0.991 95 0.838 2.059
2 0.991 64 0.895 2.366 0.385 0.992 93 0.896 2.077
3 0.993 60 0.923 2.404 0.419 0.994 92 0.924 2.086
4 0.991 58 0.940 2.423 0.435 0.997 91 0.942 2.093
5 0.998 56 0.954 2.441 0.445 0.996 91 0.952 2.094
6 0.996 56 0.958 2.442 0.451 1.000 90 0.962 2.100
7 0.997 55 0.964 2.452 0.459 0.999 90 0.967 2.101
8 1.000 54 0.972 2.460 0.459 0.999 90 0.971 2.101
9 0.997 54 0.971 2.462 0.467 0.999 90 0.973 2.101
10 1.001 53 0.978 2.469 0.467 0.999 90 0.976 2.101
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 46.77 44.03 90.80 44.22 47.61 91.83
2 46.21 40.87 87.08 42.12 47.98 90.09
3 45.99 38.73 84.72 40.94 48.28 89.22
4 45.87 37.28 83.15 40.35 48.49 88.84
5 45.80 36.30 82.10 39.72 48.66 88.38
6 45.75 35.63 81.38 39.74 48.74 88.48
7 45.71 34.67 80.39 39.37 48.82 88.19
8 45.69 34.40 80.09 39.08 48.90 87.98
9 45.67 33.69 79.36 39.02 48.94 87.96
10 45.65 33.66 79.31 38.69 49.00 87.69
For combined trading, the simulations show that in general, permits ﬂow to the credit market
and the resulting emission quota price lies in between the original permit and credit prices.
The result is an increase in production in the credit sector, both per ﬁrm and in total, and
a decrease in production in the permit sector. Combining the two schemes therefore leads to
even larger ineﬃciencies in that credit sector production is increased above the already too high
level. However, here as well the integer constraint on the number of ﬁrms produces deviations
from the theoretical analysis of Section 2.1. In several cases the product price in the credit
sector is higher under combined trading than under separate schemes. This occurs in Table 1
for b =4 ,5,6, Table 2 for b =1 ,2, Table 4 for an emission reduction of 60% and in Table 5
for emission reductions of 30, 60 and 70%. This however does not imply that in these cases,
production in the permit sector is stimulated. This occurs only in Table 5 for an emission
reduction of 60%. Note that in this case the emissions quota price for combined trading lies
22Table 4: Perfect Competition: Change in emission reduction 1
a =1 ,b =1 ,K =1 ,α = 102, β =1 ,q0 =1 ,n0 = 100, E0 =1 ,p0 =2
Permit Trading Credit Trading
EmRed qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
10 0.998 100 0.900 2.192 0.196 1.000 100 0.900 2.020 0.200
20 0.987 101 0.792 2.362 0.389 0.990 101 0.792 2.058 0.395
30 0.966 103 0.680 2.505 0.573 0.961 104 0.673 2.093 0.575
40 0.938 106 0.566 2.618 0.743 0.933 107 0.561 2.163 0.745
50 0.903 110 0.455 2.702 0.896 0.899 111 0.450 2.245 0.897
60 0.863 115 0.348 2.756 1.030 0.859 116 0.345 2.334 1.029
70 0.827 120 0.250 2.807 1.153 0.823 121 0.248 2.449 1.150
80 0.787 126 0.159 2.831 1.257 0.783 127 0.158 2.565 1.251
90 0.746 133 0.075 2.832 1.341 0.747 133 0.075 2.701 1.343
100 0.708 140 0.000 2.833 1.417 0.708 140 0.000 2.833 1.417
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
EmRed qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
10 0.998 100 0.899 2.194 0.198 1.000 100 0.901 2.019
20 0.987 101 0.791 2.365 0.392 0.990 101 0.794 2.057
30 0.966 103 0.679 2.506 0.574 0.961 104 0.674 2.093
40 0.929 107 0.559 2.599 0.741 0.933 107 0.563 2.162
50 0.903 110 0.456 2.699 0.893 0.899 111 0.452 2.243
60 0.863 115 0.348 2.756 1.030 0.859 116 0.344 2.335
70 0.820 121 0.247 2.787 1.147 0.823 121 0.249 2.447
80 0.787 126 0.163 2.823 1.249 0.783 127 0.159 2.564
90 0.746 133 0.075 2.833 1.342 0.747 133 0.076 2.700
100 0.708 140 0.000 2.833 1.417 0.708 140 0.000 2.833
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
EmRed PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 4999 4999 9998 4999 4999 9998
20 4996 4996 9992 4996 4996 9992
30 4991 4991 9983 4991 4991 9983
40 4985 4985 9969 4985 4985 9969
50 4977 4977 9953 4977 4977 9953
60 4967 4967 9934 4967 4967 9934
70 4956 4956 9912 4956 4956 9912
80 4944 4944 9888 4944 4944 9888
90 4931 4931 9863 4931 4931 9863
100 4918 4918 9835 4918 4918 9835
between the permit and credit price. Note also that in the same table for emission reductions of
80 and 90% the product price in the permit sector is lower under combined trading than in the
separate scheme. In these two cases, both sectors are stimulated as a result of combining them.
Another irregularity is that in certain cases the emissions quota price for combined trading lies
below both the permit and credit price for the separate schemes. This is the case in Table 4 for
emission reductions of 40, 50, 70 and 80% and in Table 5 for an emission reduction of 90%. The
explanation for these diﬀerences with the results of Section 2.1 is basically the same as the one
given for the separate schemes. When the number of ﬁrms is an integer, production occurs in a
point away from the lowest cost point and production under one scheme may be further away
from this point than for the other scheme. This makes all of the above-mentioned anomalies
possible.
We showed in Section 2.3 that permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit
23Table 5: Perfect Competition: Change in emission reduction 2
a =1 ,b =1 ,K =1 ,α = 12, β =0 .1, q0 =1 ,n0 = 100, E0 =1 ,p0 =2
Permit Trading Credit Trading
EmRed qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
10 1.003 98 0.918 2.174 0.169 0.998 100 0.900 2.016 0.197
20 0.988 98 0.816 2.319 0.343 0.985 101 0.792 2.047 0.387
30 0.973 98 0.714 2.464 0.518 0.962 103 0.680 2.090 0.565
40 0.943 100 0.600 2.571 0.686 0.937 105 0.571 2.160 0.731
50 0.907 103 0.485 2.657 0.843 0.904 108 0.463 2.238 0.882
60 0.874 106 0.377 2.740 0.993 0.864 112 0.357 2.323 1.014
70 0.831 111 0.270 2.782 1.121 0.825 116 0.259 2.428 1.133
80 0.791 116 0.172 2.821 1.238 0.787 120 0.167 2.553 1.241
90 0.751 122 0.082 2.840 1.338 0.750 124 0.081 2.696 1.339
100 0.710 129 0.000 2.840 1.420 0.710 129 0.000 2.840 1.420
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
EmRed qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
10 1.002 98 0.911 2.185 0.182 0.999 100 0.908 2.015
20 0.986 98 0.804 2.336 0.364 0.986 101 0.804 2.043
30 0.963 99 0.693 2.467 0.541 0.971 102 0.700 2.100
40 0.941 100 0.587 2.590 0.708 0.938 105 0.584 2.152
50 0.906 103 0.474 2.673 0.862 0.905 108 0.474 2.230
60 0.866 107 0.364 2.735 1.003 0.871 111 0.370 2.330
70 0.830 111 0.265 2.789 1.129 0.832 115 0.267 2.438
80 0.791 116 0.173 2.820 1.238 0.788 120 0.169 2.551
90 0.746 123 0.079 2.825 1.333 0.751 124 0.084 2.691
100 0.710 129 0.000 2.840 1.420 0.710 129 0.000 2.840
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
EmRed PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 499.2 499.0 998.2 499.0 499.2 998.2
20 496.6 496.2 992.8 496.2 496.6 992.8
30 492.3 491.6 983.9 491.5 492.4 983.9
40 486.3 485.4 971.7 485.4 486.3 971.7
50 478.6 477.7 956.4 477.7 478.7 956.3
60 469.5 468.6 938.1 468.5 469.7 938.1
70 458.9 458.3 917.2 458.3 459.1 917.4
80 447.1 446.8 894.0 447.2 447.1 894.3
90 434.3 434.2 868.6 434.0 434.8 868.8
100 420.6 420.6 841.2 420.9 420.9 841.7
trading. This is borne out in Tables 1 through 6. A more interesting question is whether
combining a permit and a credit trading scheme will lead to an increase or a decrease in welfare.
In Section 2.4 we showed that both results are possible. In our simulations, the only instance
where welfare decreases as a result of combining the two schemes is given in Table 5 for an
emission reduction of 50%. In all other cases, welfare either does not change or increases when
the two schemes are combined. This shows that even small diﬀerences in marginal abatement
costs can trigger an increase in welfare from combining the two schemes.
3.2 Imperfect Competition
Our simulation here consists basically of two cases with diﬀerent demand functions. For both
cases, b, a measure for the marginal abatement costs in equation (36), and the emission reduction
24Table 6: Perfect Competition: Change in emission reduction 3
a =1 ,b =1 ,K =1 ,α =3 ,β =0 .01, q0 =1 ,n0 = 100, E0 =1 ,p0 =2
Permit Trading Credit Trading
EmRed qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
10 1.001 93 0.968 2.069 0.067 0.998 99 0.909 2.012 0.178
20 1.000 86 0.930 2.140 0.140 0.987 98 0.816 2.033 0.341
30 0.996 79 0.886 2.213 0.220 0.972 96 0.729 2.067 0.486
40 0.989 72 0.833 2.288 0.311 0.951 94 0.638 2.106 0.625
50 0.983 64 0.781 2.371 0.404 0.930 90 0.556 2.163 0.750
60 0.971 56 0.714 2.456 0.514 0.901 86 0.465 2.225 0.872
70 0.949 48 0.625 2.545 0.647 0.870 80 0.375 2.304 0.990
80 0.917 39 0.513 2.642 0.809 0.836 71 0.282 2.407 1.108
90 0.860 29 0.345 2.751 1.031 0.789 58 0.172 2.542 1.234
100 0.708 24 0.000 2.830 1.415 0.708 24 0.000 2.830 1.415
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
EmRed qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
10 1.001 90 0.953 2.099 0.097 1.000 99 0.952 2.010
20 0.997 81 0.898 2.192 0.198 0.999 97 0.900 2.031
30 0.991 72 0.839 2.287 0.305 0.991 95 0.838 2.059
40 0.978 64 0.769 2.374 0.418 0.980 92 0.770 2.099
50 0.967 55 0.700 2.468 0.534 0.965 88 0.699 2.150
60 0.947 47 0.616 2.555 0.661 0.946 83 0.615 2.215
70 0.920 39 0.519 2.641 0.801 0.917 77 0.516 2.294
80 0.879 32 0.399 2.719 0.960 0.881 68 0.401 2.401
90 0.818 26 0.243 2.787 1.151 0.820 56 0.245 2.541
100 0.708 24 0.000 2.830 1.415 0.708 24 0.000 2.830
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
EmRed PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 49.66 49.21 98.87 49.30 49.76 99.06
20 48.60 47.08 95.68 47.36 49.00 96.36
30 46.77 44.03 90.80 44.22 47.61 91.83
40 44.10 40.04 84.14 40.17 45.45 85.61
50 40.50 35.60 76.10 35.07 42.50 77.57
60 35.85 30.27 66.13 29.33 38.37 67.70
70 30.01 24.42 54.43 22.94 32.78 55.72
80 22.73 18.02 40.75 16.33 25.31 41.64
90 13.56 10.66 24.22 9.534 15.02 24.55
100 1.472 1.472 2.943 1.472 1.472 2.944
level are varied to yield diﬀerent results. Furthermore, the welfare levels and some special cases
under permit and credit trading are discussed. The simulation results for imperfect competition
are shown in Tables 7 to 13. In Tables 7, 9 and 11 the inverse demand function is relatively ﬂat,
while in the other Tables the slope is relatively steep. In all cases, there are four ﬁrms when
there is no regulation. However, because the demand functions are diﬀerent, ﬁrm production
and emissions are diﬀerent in the two cases.
The ﬁrst main result from the simulations is that the number of ﬁrms under credit trading is
always at least as high as that under permit trading. This result is expected since the demand
function is linear, so that inequality (21) holds. Furthermore, product price p is always lower
under credit trading. This conﬁrms the results of the analysis in Section 2. The simulations
also conﬁrm the results of the general analysis for the case where the number of ﬁrms is equal
under the two schemes. Here, ﬁrm and total output are higher under credit trading and the
25Table 7: Imperfect Competition 1
a =1 ,K = 100, α = 50, β =1
q0 =7 .14, n0 =4 ,E0 =7 .14, p0 =2 1 .43, π0 =2 .04 L =2 0
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
1 7.92 3 6.67 26.25 26.91 2.50 6.90 4 5.00 22.42 3.44 3.79
2 7.67 3 6.67 27.00 19.56 4.00 6.71 4 5.00 23.15 4.50 6.85
3 7.50 3 6.67 27.50 14.58 5.00 6.57 4 5.00 23.73 5.36 9.40
4 7.38 3 6.67 27.86 11.00 5.71 6.45 4 5.00 24.20 6.09 11.60
5 7.29 3 6.67 28.13 8.29 6.25 6.35 4 5.00 24.59 6.73 13.52
6 7.22 3 6.67 28.33 6.17 6.67 6.27 4 5.00 24.92 7.29 15.23
7 7.17 3 6.67 28.50 4.47 7.00 6.20 4 5.00 25.21 7.80 16.76
8 7.12 3 6.67 28.64 3.08 7.27 6.13 4 5.00 25.46 8.26 18.15
9 7.08 3 6.67 28.75 1.91 7.50 6.08 4 5.00 25.68 8.69 19.43
10 7.05 3 6.67 28.85 0.92 7.69 6.03 4 5.00 25.88 9.08 20.60
20 10.00 2 10.00 30.00 100.00 0.00 5.72 4 5.00 27.11 11.98 28.87
50 10.00 2 10.00 30.00 100.00 0.00 5.40 4 5.00 28.40 16.22 39.95
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
1 7.80 3 6.21 26.59 24.30 3.18 6.93 4 5.34 22.26 2.67
2 7.43 3 6.08 27.71 14.10 5.42 6.80 4 5.44 22.82 2.81
3 7.15 3 5.98 28.54 6.54 7.08 6.70 4 5.52 23.21 2.74
4 6.94 3 5.89 29.18 0.69 8.36 6.62 4 5.58 23.50 2.59
5 8.33 2 7.49 33.34 42.19 8.36 6.62 4 5.79 23.50 1.72
6 8.33 2 7.63 33.34 41.61 8.36 6.62 4 5.93 23.50 1.13
7 8.33 2 7.73 33.34 41.20 8.36 6.62 4 6.03 23.50 0.72
8 8.32 2 7.80 33.35 40.78 8.38 6.62 4 6.10 23.51 0.41
9 8.25 2 7.77 33.50 38.29 8.74 6.60 4 6.12 23.59 0.26
10 8.19 2 7.74 33.62 36.14 9.06 6.59 4 6.13 23.66 0.12
20 7.04 3 6.85 28.87 0.00 7.73 7.78 3 7.59 26.66 39.01
50 7.06 3 6.98 28.82 0.00 7.64 7.79 3 7.71 26.64 38.54
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 412.98 394.52 807.50 406.00 399.31 805.31
2 403.40 378.18 781.58 389.53 390.60 780.12
3 396.92 366.57 763.50 376.65 384.75 761.40
4 392.47 357.13 749.60 366.54 380.54 747.08
5 389.15 349.55 738.71 348.39 384.06 732.45
6 386.48 343.54 730.02 349.56 386.42 735.98
7 384.79 338.52 723.31 350.40 388.10 738.50
8 382.93 333.97 716.90 350.70 389.32 740.02
9 381.41 330.41 711.82 348.60 388.85 737.46
10 380.40 327.23 707.63 346.65 388.66 735.31
20 400.00 309.79 709.79 382.02 410.87 792.89
50 400.00 298.08 698.08 384.21 412.53 796.74
credit price is higher than the permit price.
Another general result is that the number of ﬁrms can increase or decrease as a result of
regulation. This holds under both instruments. As with perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms
will increase when demand is very inelastic (Tables 8 and 12) and decrease when demand is more
elastic (Tables 7 and 9). The explanation for this is the same as under perfect competition:
regulation lowers the optimal production level, and more so under credit trading than under
permit trading, while demand decreases more, the more elastic demand is. This implies that
there will be room for more ﬁrms the more inelastic demand is.
26Table 8: Imperfect Competition 2
a =1 ,K = 100, α = 150, β =6 .6
q0 =4 .29, n0 =4 ,E0 =4 .29, p0 =3 6 .86, π0 =3 9 .59 L =1 2 .00
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
1 4.22 4 3.00 38.69 36.58 2.43 4.25 4 3.00 37.75 40.85 2.50
2 4.15 4 3.00 40.34 33.80 4.62 3.55 5 2.40 32.69 0.92 4.62
3 4.10 4 3.00 41.82 31.21 6.59 3.53 5 2.40 33.47 1.87 6.79
4 4.05 4 3.00 43.17 28.83 8.37 3.51 5 2.40 34.20 2.77 8.87
5 4.00 4 3.00 44.40 26.60 10.00 3.49 5 2.40 34.89 3.62 10.88
6 3.96 4 3.00 45.52 24.53 11.49 3.47 5 2.40 35.55 4.42 12.82
7 3.92 4 3.00 46.56 22.59 12.86 3.45 5 2.40 36.18 5.17 14.69
8 3.88 4 3.00 47.51 20.78 14.12 3.43 5 2.40 36.77 5.90 16.50
9 3.85 4 3.00 48.38 19.08 15.28 3.41 5 2.40 37.34 6.58 18.25
10 3.82 4 3.00 49.20 17.49 16.36 3.40 5 2.40 37.89 7.24 19.95
20 3.60 4 3.00 54.96 5.70 24.00 3.26 5 2.40 42.29 12.47 34.55
50 4.28 3 4.00 65.19 43.47 28.35 3.04 5 2.40 49.70 21.36 63.95
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
1 4.22 4 2.99 38.71 36.57 2.45 4.25 4 3.03 37.73 40.79
2 4.15 4 3.00 40.34 33.80 4.62 3.55 5 2.40 32.69 0.92
3 4.09 4 2.98 41.91 31.15 6.69 3.53 5 2.42 33.43 1.77
4 4.04 4 2.96 43.37 28.64 8.64 3.51 5 2.43 34.11 2.53
5 3.99 4 2.94 44.74 26.28 10.46 3.49 5 2.45 34.74 3.19
6 3.94 4 2.92 46.04 24.03 12.17 3.47 5 2.46 35.33 3.78
7 3.89 4 2.91 47.25 21.90 13.78 3.46 5 2.47 35.87 4.30
8 3.85 4 2.89 48.40 19.88 15.30 3.44 5 2.49 36.38 4.76
9 3.81 4 2.88 49.49 17.95 16.74 3.43 5 2.50 36.85 5.17
10 3.77 4 2.86 50.52 16.12 18.11 3.42 5 2.51 37.30 5.53
20 3.47 4 2.75 58.47 1.62 28.65 3.32 5 2.60 40.58 7.58
50 3.79 3 3.37 74.88 18.32 42.25 3.20 5 2.78 44.41 7.01
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 1115,36 1117,38 2232,73 1115,43 1117,50 2232,93
2 1100,35 1045,14 2145,49 1100,35 1045,14 2145,49
3 1091,16 1037,66 2128,83 1088,13 1037,98 2126,11
4 1081,43 1030,11 2111,54 1078,48 1030,64 2109,12
5 1071,20 1022,56 2093,76 1068,29 1023,92 2092,21
6 1063,67 1015,09 2078,77 1057,73 1016,93 2074,66
7 1055,87 1007,70 2063,57 1047,19 1013,61 2060,80
8 1047,68 1000,29 2047,97 1038,90 1007,60 2046,50
9 1042,23 993,03 2035,25 1030,91 1004,49 2035,41
10 1036,62 989,27 2025,89 1021,95 1001,53 2023,47
20 995,07 940,07 1935,14 957,15 974,86 1932,01
50 1014,80 869,11 1883,92 908,89 959,98 1868,87
For the case where the number of ﬁrms is higher under credit trading than under permit
trading, the general analysis did not yield many clear results. In the simulations, ﬁrm output is
always lower under credit trading than under permit trading. However, this is not a conclusive
result since we only have a few simulations.
As already mentioned, the product price is lower under credit trading than under permit
trading. Furthermore, the product price increases with b (see Tables 7 and 8). Since b is the
parameter controlling the size of the marginal abatement costs, this result is expected. One
might also expect that the product price is decreasing in total emissions L. Although this holds
27Table 9: Imperfect Competition 3
a =1 ,b =1 ,K = 100, α = 50, β =1 ,q0 =7 .14, n0 =4 ,E0 =7 .14, p0 =2 1 .43, π0 =2 .04
Permit Trading Credit Trading
%Red qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
10 —∗ — ———— 7.08 4 6.43 21.67 2.87 1.31
20 8.16 3 7.62 25.54 33.29 1.07 7.00 4 5.71 22.00 3.34 2.57
30 7.91 3 6.67 26.25 26.91 2.50 6.90 4 5.00 22.42 3.44 3.79
40 7.68 3 5.71 26.96 21.78 3.93 6.77 4 4.29 22.92 3.16 4.97
50 7.44 3 4.76 27.68 17.90 5.36 6.62 4 3.57 23.51 2.51 6.10
60 7.20 3 3.81 28.39 15.26 6.79 6.46 4 2.86 24.18 1.45 7.20
70 6.96 3 2.86 29.11 13.87 8.21 —∗ —— — — —
80 6.73 3 1.90 29.82 13.73 9.64 6.96 3 1.90 29.13 28.73 10.10
90 6.49 3 0.95 30.54 14.83 11.07 6.62 3 0.95 30.13 23.52 11.34
100 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19 12.50 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19 12.50
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
%Red qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
10 8.25 3 7.99 25.26 36.08 0.52 7.12 4 6.86 21.52 2.26
20 8.02 3 7.09 25.93 29.61 1.86 7.04 4 6.11 21.84 2.62
30 7.80 3 6.21 26.59 24.30 3.18 6.93 4 5.34 22.26 2.67
40 7.59 3 5.35 27.24 20.12 4.48 6.81 4 4.56 22.78 2.44
50 7.37 3 4.50 27.88 17.03 5.76 6.65 4 3.77 23.39 1.92
60 7.17 3 3.66 28.50 14.96 7.01 6.47 4 2.97 24.11 1.09
70 6.96 3 2.83 29.13 13.85 8.26 7.32 3 3.18 28.06 31.95
80 6.69 3 1.76 29.93 13.82 9.87 6.99 3 2.06 29.04 28.26
90 6.47 3 0.86 30.60 15.00 11.20 6.64 3 1.04 30.07 23.24
100 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19 12.50 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
%Red PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 —∗ 412.86 — 413.87 415.37 829.24
20 423.60 405.40 829.00 418.10 409.77 827.87
30 412.76 394.16 806.92 406.20 399.71 805.90
40 398.01 379.32 777.33 391.23 385.20 776.43
50 379.34 360.99 740.33 373.40 366.24 739.64
60 356.77 339.23 696.00 352.90 342.70 695.60
70 330.28 — — 329.33 344.73 674.06
80 299.88 303.97 603.85 294.78 308.95 603.72
90 265.57 268.02 533.58 262.16 271.38 533.54
100 227.34 227.34 454.69 227.34 227.34 454.69
∗ — indicates that the emission reduction level is not obtainable (see Tables 10 and 11).
as long as the number of ﬁrms remains the same or decreases, it may not hold when the number
of ﬁrms increases. This is shown in Table 12, for both permit trading and credit trading, where
the product price falls when the number of ﬁrms increases, even though the emission reduction
level is higher. Here, two eﬀects are at play. First, the higher emission reduction level will
increase marginal abatement costs. However, if at the same time proﬁts rise with stricter policy,
as is the case here, entry will take place at some point. As is shown in appendix B, entry leads
to higher total output and lower product price. In some cases, the output-increasing eﬀect of
entry is larger than the cost-increasing eﬀect of stricter policy, so that prices fall.
As with perfect competition, the permit price may be higher than the credit price. This is
shown in Table 12 for emission reductions of 40 to 80%. Notice that at these emission reduction
levels there are four ﬁrms in the permit sector and ﬁve in the credit sector. At the same
28Table 10: Some L not obtainable with permit trading
a =1 ,b =1 ,K = 100, α = 50, β =1 ,q0 =7 .14, n0 =4 ,E0 =7 .14, p0 =2 1 .43, π0 =2 .04
%e m . r e d . L
￿
Eq p np Ep pp πp Rp
4.6729 27.2363 27.2363 7.0687 4 6.8091 21.7253 0.0000 0.5192










12.4999 25.0000 25.0000 8.3333 3 8.3333 25.0000 38.8889 0.0000
12.5006 24.9998 24.9998 8.3333 3 8.3333 25.0000 38.8884 0.0001
Table 11: Some L are not obtainable with credit trading
a =1 ,b =1 ,K = 100, α = 50, β =1 ,q0 =7 .14, n0 =4 ,E0 =7 .14, p0 =2 1 .43, π0 =2 .04
¯ e %e m . r e d . Lq c nc Ec pc πc Rc
0.3438 69.8225 8.6221 6.2703 4 2.1555 24.9187 0.0000 8.2296
0.3438 74.2603 7.3542 7.1310 3 2.4514 28.6071 31.2473 9.3591
time, proﬁts are high in the permit sector and low in the credit sector. This implies that ﬁrm
production in the credit sector is close to the zero-proﬁt point, while that in the permit sector
occurs at a less eﬃcient scale. In this case, ﬁrm production in the permit sector takes place at
such an ineﬃcient level that marginal abatement costs become higher than in the credit sector,
even though credit trading is a less eﬃcient form of regulation. Note also that the permit price
falls as we move from 80 to 90% emission reduction. At 90% a new ﬁrm has entered the permit
sector and ﬁrm production is suddenly very close to the zero-proﬁt level, and therefore much
more eﬃcient than before. Hence, with imperfect competition, ﬁrm entry may lead to lower
marginal abatement costs and thereby lower emission quota prices.
We now turn to the eﬀect of the two schemes on proﬁts. In Tables 7 and 8, for a given
number of ﬁrms, under permit trading proﬁts decrease in b, while under credit trading they
increase in b. Furthermore, with the number of ﬁrms constant, regulation leads to a decrease in
proﬁts with permit trading and to an increase with credit trading. Basically, regulation has two
eﬀects. First of all, regulation increases production costs and thereby lowers proﬁts. Second, it
lowers ﬁrm production. As long as the number of ﬁrms remains constant, this also means lower
total production and thereby higher price. Since production under oligopoly is higher than the
joint proﬁt-maximizing (monopoly) level, the latter eﬀect gives higher proﬁts for all ﬁrms. The
simulations show that under permit trading the former eﬀect is stronger than the latter, while
the reverse is the case under credit trading. The intuition for this is that under permit trading,
output is already closer to the monopoly level than under credit trading. Reducing output will
then have a smaller positive eﬀect on proﬁts under permit trading than under credit trading.
The eﬀect of decreasing L on proﬁts depends on the level of L. For permit trading proﬁts
ﬁrst fall given n, and then rise as L diminishes (Tables 9 and 12). Table 9 shows the reverse
happening for credit trading, while in Table 12 proﬁts rise continually with lower L.W i t hab
higher than 3.3, credit trading always results initially in a rise in proﬁt and then a decline with
29Table 12: Imperfect Competition 4
a =1 ,b =1 ,K = 100, α = 150, β =6 .6, q0 =4 .29, n0 =4 ,E0 =4 .29, p0 =3 6 .86, π0 =3 9 .59
Permit Trading Credit Trading
%Red qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
10 4.26 4 3.86 37.47 38.25 0.81 4.28 4 3.86 37.07 40.08 0.85
20 4.24 4 3.43 38.08 37.25 1.62 4.27 4 3.43 37.36 40.49 1.68
30 4.22 4 3.00 38.69 36.58 2.43 4.25 4 3.00 37.75 40.85 2.50
40 4.19 4 2.57 39.30 36.25 3.24 3.57 5 2.06 32.30 0.20 3.02
50 4.17 4 2.14 39.92 36.26 4.05 3.55 5 1.71 32.80 0.50 3.67
60 4.15 4 1.71 40.53 36.60 4.86 3.53 5 1.37 33.38 0.78 4.33
70 4.12 4 1.29 41.14 37.28 5.66 3.51 5 1.03 34.03 1.06 4.97
80 4.10 4 0.86 41.75 38.30 6.49 3.49 5 0.69 34.76 1.32 5.61
90 3.46 5 0.34 35.95 0.47 6.23 3.47 5 0.34 35.57 1.57 6.25
100 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79 6.88 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79 6.88
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
%Red qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
10 4.26 4 3.85 37.48 38.23 0.83 4.28 4 3.87 37.06 40.06
20 4.24 4 3.42 38.10 37.22 1.65 4.27 4 3.44 37.35 40.47
30 4.22 4 2.99 38.71 36.57 2.45 4.25 4 3.03 37.73 40.79
40 4.20 4 2.64 39.21 36.28 3.12 3.57 5 2.01 32.34 0.33
50 4.18 4 2.25 39.76 36.22 3.85 3.55 5 1.63 32.88 0.74
60 4.16 4 1.87 40.30 36.44 4.57 3.53 5 1.25 33.51 1.18
70 4.14 4 1.49 40.85 36.91 5.29 3.51 5 0.87 34.22 1.63
80 4.12 4 1.13 41.35 37.60 5.96 3.49 5 0.50 34.99 2.01
90 3.46 5 0.34 35.96 0.49 6.24 3.47 5 0.35 35.57 1.54
100 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79 6.88 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
%Red PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 1124.85 1126.57 2251.42 1124.78 1126.62 2251.40
20 1120.17 1123.18 2243.35 1119.99 1123.31 2243.30
30 1114.11 1118.02 2232.13 1113.95 1118.36 2232.32
40 1106.67 1050.51 2157.18 1107.89 1049.57 2157.47
50 1097.86 1043.10 2140.96 1100.26 1041.18 2141.44
60 1087.67 1034.32 2122.00 1091.56 1031.10 2122.66
70 1076.11 1024.17 2100.28 1081.82 1019.34 2101.17
80 1063.17 1012.65 2075.82 1071.70 1006.61 2078.31
90 998.46 999.74 1998.20 998.26 999.97 1998.22
100 985.44 985.44 1970.88 985.44 985.44 1970.88
lower L (not shown).
In Propositions 5 and 6 we showed that under both schemes it is possible that certain
emission levels cannot be attained. This is illustrated in Tables 9 to 11. As Table 10 shows,
under the given circumstances, emission reductions between 4.67% and 12.5% are not obtainable
with permit trading. The reason is that at emission reduction level 4.67% the number of ﬁrms in
the market decreases to three and the emission limit becomes non-binding. The three remaining
ﬁrms emit a total amount of 25 without regulation, which corresponds to an emission reduction
of 12.5%. Only at an emission reduction level higher than 12.5% does the emission limit become
binding again.
For credit trading something similar happens. As the relative standard is tightened, exit
may occur, as is shown in Tables 9 and 11. As a result, total output decreases, but since the
relative standard is ﬁxed at this level, total emissions will decrease as well. In Table 11 this
30Table 13: Some L can be obtained with diﬀerent ¯ e
a =1 ,b =1 ,K = 100, α = 150, β =6 .6
q0 =4 .29, n0 =4 ,E0 =4 .29, p0 =3 6 .86, π0 =3 9 .59
Credit Trading
¯ e %.red. qc nc Ec pc πc Rc L
0.6730 33.317 4.246 4 2.858 37.895 40.956 2.777 11.431
0.6670 33.928 4.245 4 2.832 37.923 40.974 2.827 11.327
0.6610 34.539 4.244 4 2.806 37.952 40.993 2.878 11.222
0.6550 35.150 4.243 4 2.779 37.981 41.011 2.928 11.117
0.6490 35.761 4.242 4 2.753 38.010 41.028 2.978 11.012
0.6430 36.372 4.241 4 2.727 38.040 41.046 3.028 10.908
0.6396 36.715 4.240 4 2.712 38.057 41.055 3.056 10.849
0.6396 33.296 3.576 5 2.287 32.008 0.000 2.577 11.435
0.6370 33.576 3.575 5 2.277 32.019 0.009 2.596 11.387
0.6310 34.217 3.574 5 2.255 32.046 0.028 2.638 11.277
0.6250 34.857 3.575 5 2.234 32.073 0.047 2.680 11.167
0.6190 35.497 3.573 5 2.212 32.100 0.067 2.722 11.058
0.6130 36.137 3.572 5 2.190 32.127 0.086 2.765 10.948
0.6070 36.777 3.571 5 2.168 32.155 0.105 2.807 10.838
happens when the relative standard is 0.3438. Here, proﬁts become zero and a ﬁrm will exit. In
this case, emission reductions between 69.82% and 74.26% are unobtainable.
Under credit trading it is also possible that certain emission levels can be reached by two
diﬀerent relative standards (see Proposition 6). This is illustrated in Table 13 which shows what
happens as the relative standard is tightened from 0.673 to 0.607. At ﬁrst, proﬁts increase as the
emission limit decreases. Then, when the relative standard is 0.6396, proﬁts become so large that
entry occurs. This results in an increase in total output. Since the relative standard determines
allowed emissions per unit of output, this also implies that total emissions will increase, which
is also shown in the Table. Only at a relative standard of about 0.61 are total emissions back
at the level where entry occurred. Table 13 shows that emission reduction percentages between
33.3 and 36.72 can be attained with two diﬀerent relative standards.
In all cases, combining the two emissions trading schemes leads to a stimulation of the sector
with the highest quota price at the expense of the other sector. In most cases, this means that
the credit sector is stimulated. Only in Table 12 for emission reductions of 40 to 80% is the
permit sector stimulated since here the permit price is higher than the credit price.
One of the unresolved issues is which instrument leads to highest welfare. As a glance at
Tables 7 through 12 shows, it is usually permit trading that leads to higher welfare. Credit
trading leads to higher welfare only in Table 8 for b = 1, Table 9 for emission reductions of 80
and 90%, and in Table 12 for emission reductions of 10, 20, 30 and 90%. It is worth noting
that these are all cases where marginal abatement costs are either very low or very high. At
these levels, the diﬀerence in abatement costs between permit trading and credit trading is less
pronounced and the additional production under credit trading has a larger impact on welfare
than the increase in abatement cost.
Combining the two schemes can lead to both an increase or a decrease in welfare. Increases
in welfare are shown in Table 7 for b =6t ob = 50, Table 8 for b = 1 and for b = 9 and in
31Table 12 for emission reductions of 30 to 90%. In Table 7 the increase in welfare comes from the
large saving in abatement costs as a result of combining the schemes. There is a large diﬀerence
between the permit and the credit price, while the quota price under combined trading is quite
close to the permit price in the separate scheme. In Table 12 it should be remembered that
here combined trading stimulates the permit sector for emission reductions of 40 to 80%. Here
then, welfare increases because the permit sector is stimulated as a result of combining the two
schemes.
4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed and compared two types of emissions trading to see whether they
function similarly or diﬀerently under two market structures: perfect and imperfect competition.
The ﬁrst type is permit trading, which is emissions trading based on an absolute cap on emissions,
while credit trading is based on relative caps on emissions. The major general result is that credit
trading leads to higher total output than permit trading. The explanation for this is that in the
credit trading scheme, output is subsidized by allowing additional emissions, whereas in a permit
trading scheme, additional output requires either extra abatement costs or purchase of permits.
This result holds under both perfect and imperfect competition. However, in other respects, the
eﬀect of the two schemes may be rather diﬀerent under perfect and imperfect competition.
The general model shows that under perfect competition, credit trading always leads to
higher abatement costs than permit trading. This is the consequence of the higher level of
output with credit trading. Since marginal abatement costs are higher with credit trading,
the price of credits is higher than the price of permits. The implicit subsidization of output
in the credit scheme has consequences for welfare. Since ﬁrms get extra credits for free when
increasing output, total output in the credit sector is too high. At the margin of production,
marginal beneﬁts to the consumer are lower than the actual marginal cost. This implies that the
marginal abatement costs are not included fully in the market price of output. The combination
of too high output and too high marginal abatement costs makes credit trading an inferior
instrument compared with permit trading.
The two schemes can be combined by allowing the use of credits to cover emissions in the
permit sector and vice versa. Emissions trading will lead to a uniform price in the two sectors,
lowering the price of credits, while raising the price of permits. The lower abatement costs
stimulate output in the credit sector, increasing the sector’s emissions while the higher abatement
costs reduce output and emissions in the permit sector. Consequently, the discrepancy in terms
of output and abatement eﬀort between the two sectors will increase by allowing emission trading
between them, exacerbating the welfare loss due to overproduction in the credit sector. However,
there is also a positive welfare eﬀect. The sale of emission allowances from ﬁrms in the permit
sector to ﬁrms in the credit sector leads to an increase in abatement in the permit sector
where marginal abatement costs are relatively low, whereas abatement decreases in the credit
sector, where marginal abatement costs are relatively high. The result is that total abatement
32costs decrease. The savings on total abatement costs can exceed the welfare loss due to higher
production in the credit sector. This is most likely to be the case when marginal abatement
costs rise sharply and price elasticity of output demand is low. In the reverse case, welfare will
decrease.
With imperfect competition, it still holds that under separate schemes, the credit sector
has higher output at lower output price, higher marginal abatement costs and a higher price
for emission allowances than the permit sector. Combining the two sectors again increases the
discrepancy in sector outputs and emissions. However, the welfare impacts are diﬀerent. With
imperfect competition, output is below the welfare-maximizing level. Here the stimulus credit
trading gives to output, which is missing in the permit trading scheme, counteracts the output
distortion caused by the structure of the market. The positive welfare eﬀect may be such that a
credit trading scheme performs better on welfare than a permit scheme. If the separate sectors
are linked and the discrepancies in output increase, this may have a positive impact on welfare
(which it never has under perfect competition), thus supporting the positive eﬀect of lower
abatement costs.
However, the above general conclusions on imperfect competition are only valid when credit
and permit trading result in the same number of ﬁrms. For the likely case where there are more
ﬁrms in the credit sector than in the permit sector, the formal proof could not be given and
we had to rely on simulations. In all, except one, speciﬁc ranges of simulations, the general
conclusions are conﬁrmed for the case where credit trading leads to a higher number of ﬁrms in
the industry than permit trading. The exception is the case where with separate markets, the
permit price is higher than the credit price. The anomaly seems to reﬂect the impact of entry
and exit of ﬁrms when there are few incumbents.
Previous contributions have largely ignored the constraint that the number of ﬁrms must
be an integer. Taking this constraint into account has particulary dramatic consequences under
imperfect competition. We ﬁnd that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total
industry emissions with permit or credit trading. It can also occur that there are multiple levels
of the relative standard that achieve the same level of industry emissions.
The major message of this paper for policy makers is that under imperfect competition, one
cannot in general say that credit trading is an ineﬃcient instrument.
We have assumed that the government sets its instrument such that an absolute limit on
emissions is reached. This may be unrealistic, especially for the case of relative standards and
credit trading, since the government may have too little information to set the standard correctly.
Another issue that would warrant further research is how the instruments work when ﬁrms are
heterogeneous. In this paper, ﬁrms are homogeneous and therefore there is no trading in the
separate schemes.
33A Comparative Statics for Perfect Competition
In this Appendix, the eﬀects on output per ﬁrm q, emission level per ﬁrm E, product price p
and number of ﬁrms n of a change in the total limit on emissions L will be derived. Assuming
a change from a non-binding limit to a limit that is just binding will allow us to analyze the
eﬀect of the introduction of regulation.
A.1 Permit Trading
A.1.1 Short Run
In the short run, the following conditions must hold under permit trading
p = Cq (38)
−CE = Rp (39)
p = p(nq) (40)
Diﬀerentiating equations (38)-(40) totally with respect to E gives
dp
dE
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2 − CEECqq







np  − Cqq
< 0 (46)
The signs of equations (44)-(46) follow from the assumptions on the cost function and condition
(58).
A.1.2 Long Run
In the long run, we need that (38)-(40) and the two following conditions hold
pq = C(q,E)+RpE (47)
nE = L (48)







is positive semideﬁnite (49)
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The signs for the diﬀerent equations are found through conditions
CqqCEE − C2
qE ≥ 0 (58)
H ≡ q2Cqq +2 qECqE + E2CEE ≥ 0 (59)
qCqq + ECqE > 0 (60)
qCqE + ECEE < 0 (61)
35Conditions (58) and (59) follow from the second order condition given in (49). The LHS of (58)
is the determinant of (49) and must be non-negative. Condition (59) follows from the fact that
hCxxh  ≥ 0 for any vector h. In this case, h =( qE ). Condition (60) is required to guarantee
monotonicity with credit trading. By monotonicity we mean that industry emissions should
decline when L decreases (see Dijkstra (1999) p. 80 for a discussion). Condition (61) ensures
that under credit trading product price decreases with emissions.
It is clear from (59) and (58) that the denominator of (53)-(57) is negative. It can then
be easily established that
dqp
dL > 0, dEp
dL > 0, dRp
dL < 0a n d
dpp
dL ≤ 0. However, dnp
dL can either
be positive or negative, as the ﬁrst term in the nominator is positive and the second term is
negative. Note however that if p  =0 , dnp
dL > 0, implying that as the emissions limit decreases,
the number of ﬁrms will decrease when demand is inﬁnitely elastic. On the other hand, when
p  →− ∞ , dnp
dL < 0, implying that when demand is totally inelastic the number of ﬁrms will
increase when the emission limit decreases.
A.2 Credit Trading
A.2.1 Short Run
For credit trading, the following conditions must hold in the short run
p = Cq − RcE
q
(62)
−CE = Rc (63)
p = p(nq) (64)
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nqp  (CE + ECEE + qCqE)
ECE + q2np  − q (ECqE + qCqq)
< 0 (67)
The denominators in (65)-(67) are negative because of (60). The signs of (65) and (67) then
follow from (61). The sign of dRc/dE is ambiguous. However, when going from no regulation
(where CE = 0) to regulation, dRc/dE < 0.
36Combined Trading For combined trading, the comparative statics change somewhat. Above,
we analyzed the eﬀect of a change in total emissions through a change in the emission standard
¯ e. Now, total emissions in the credit sector change through an inﬂux of quotas. As a result,
total output in the credit sector rises. Then the emission standard has to be tightened, so that





We still need (62)-(64). Diﬀerentiating these with respect to E and using (68) gives
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p  − CqE − q Cqq
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nqp  (¯ eCEE + CqE)
¯ eCE + qnp  − q (¯ eCqE + Cqq)
< 0 (71)
The denominators are negative by the fact that ¯ e<E / qand (60). The signs of (69) and (71)
follow from (61) and the sign of (70) follows from (58).
A.2.2 Long Run
In the long run, (62)-(64) and the following conditions must hold
pq = C(q,E) (72)
nE = L (73)
The second order condition is given by (49).
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(nq2p  + ECE)(E2CEE +2 qECqE + q2Cqq)
(78)
Using conditions (58) to (61), it is clear that the denominator of (74)-(78) is negative. It can
then be established that
dqc
dL > 0, dEc
dL > 0, dR
dL < 0a n d
dpc
dL ≤ 0. However, as with permit trading,
the sign of dnc
dL is not immediately clear since the ﬁrst term in parenthesis in the nominator is
negative, while the second term in parenthesis is positive. Hence, the number of ﬁrms can both
increase or decrease as a result of regulation. However, as with permit trading, dn
dL > 0f o rp  =0
and dn
dL < 0f o rp  →− ∞ . This implies that when demand is inﬁnitely elastic the number of
ﬁrms will decrease as the emissions limit decreases and that when demand is totally inelastic
the number of ﬁrms will increase when the emission limit decreases.
Combined Trading
For the credit sector under combined trading, we still need conditions (62)-(64) and (73) to hold,
but the zero-proﬁt condition changes to
pq = C(q,E)+Rc(E − ¯ eq) (79)
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To determine the sign of (80)-(85) we need conditions (58)-(61). D is negative from M<n E ,
(58) and (59). dq/dL and dE/dL are positive by (60) and (61). dR/dL and dp/dL are negative
by (58) and M<n E . The sign of dn/dL is ambiguous.
B Comparative Statics for Imperfect Competition
B.1 Short run
B.1.1 Permit trading
In the short run, the following conditions must hold for permit trading
p + p q = Cq (86)
−CE = R (87)
p = p(nq) (88)
For the comparative statics we diﬀerentiate (86) to (88) totally with respect to E:
dp
dE
+ p  n
dq
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< 0 (95)
The denominators on the RHS are negative by (21) and Cqq > 0. So in the short run, a tightening
of environmental policy leads to lower output, a higher permit price and a higher product price.
B.1.2 Credit trading
In the short run, the following conditions must hold for credit trading
p + p q = Cq − ¯ eR (96)
and (87) and (88).
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q CE − [qCqq + ECqE]
< 0 (99)
with V> 0 given by (91) and Z>0 by (92). The denominators are negative by (21) and
(60). The numerators are negative in (97) and positive in (99) by (61) and (21). The sign of
the numerator in (98) is ambiguous. Note however that when environmental policy goes from
non-binding to binding, CE = 0 and (98) is negative. So under credit trading, a tightening of
2The inequalities follow from (61) and (21).
40environmental policy will lead to lower ﬁrm and industry production, while the credit price may
increase or decrease. However, initially, when environmental policy becomes binding, the credit
price will rise.
B.1.3 Combined Trading
Under combined trading, (87), (88) and (96) still need to hold for the credit sector. However,
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q CE − (nqCqq + MCqE)
< 0 (102)
with V> 0 given by (91) and M<n E . The denominators are negative by (21) and (60). The
numerators are positive in (100) and negative in (102) by (61) and (21). The numerator in (101)
is negative by (91) and (21).
B.2 Long run
Unlike the case with perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms now does not change continuously
as environmental policy becomes stricter and stricter. The strictness of environmental policy
will aﬀect the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. If proﬁts decrease, a ﬁrm will leave the industry just before proﬁts
turn into losses, thereby restoring proﬁtability for the remaining ﬁrms. If proﬁts increase, this
might attract another ﬁrm to the industry, which will reduce proﬁts for each ﬁrm. In subsection
B.2.1, we will derive the comparative statics for the case where the number of ﬁrms remains
constant. In subsection B.2.2, we analyze the eﬀects of a change in the number of ﬁrms.
B.2.1 Constant number of ﬁrms
Permit trading. The comparative statics for permit trading are the same as for the short run.
We only need to determine the eﬀect on proﬁts. From (25) and (87), proﬁts can be written as:
π = pq − C(q,E)+ECE (103)
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The denominator on the RHS is negative by (21). The sign of the numerator is ambiguous, since
all terms are positive by (61), (104) and (21).
Thus, the eﬀect of the strictness of environmental policy on proﬁts, and thereby on the entry
or exit of ﬁrms, is ambiguous.
Credit trading. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to q now becomes:






The ﬁrst order condition with respect to E is still (87).
For the comparative statics, diﬀerentiate (105), (87) and (88) totally with respect to E:
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with V> 0 given by (91) and Z>0 by (92). The numerator is negative in (107) and positive in
(109) by (61). The sign of (108) is ambiguous. The result is basically the same as in the short
run. A tightening of environmental policy leads to lower ﬁrm and industry output, while the
credit price may increase or decrease. Note however that when environmental policy is tightened
from non-binding to binding, the credit price will increase since in that case CE =0 .
In the long run, proﬁts under credit trading are given by
π = pq − C(q,E) (110)
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where F<0 is given by (106). The sign of the nominator on the RHS of (111) is ambiguous
since the ﬁrst term is positive by (61) and −FC E is positive. Thus, the eﬀect of the strictness
of environmental policy on proﬁts, and thereby on the entry or exit of ﬁrms, is ambiguous.
Combined trading. Under combined trading, the comparative statics for the credit sector are
somewhat diﬀerent than the analysis given above for credit trading. Speciﬁcally, ¯ e is now given






























43and (89) and (90). Deﬁning:5
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The signs of the numerators follow from (61) for (113) and (115) and from (91) for (114).
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where S<0 is given (112). The sign of (116) is ambiguous which follows from (61), (58), (59)
and (21).
Therefore, in all cases, it is ambiguous in general whether proﬁts, and by implication the
number of ﬁrms, increase or decrease as environmental policy is tightened.
B.2.2 A change in the number of ﬁrms
Permit trading. Diﬀerentiate (86)-(88) totally with respect to n:
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p  [qCqq + ECqE − p q]
Cqq − (n +1 ) p  − nqp   < 0 (122)
with V> 0 given by (91) and Z>0 by (92). The denominator is positive by (21). The
numerators in (120) and (122) are negative by (21). The sign of (121) is ambiguous. So an
increase in the number of ﬁrms will under permit trading lead to lower ﬁrm output, but higher
industry output. The permit price may either increase or decrease as a result of the higher
number of ﬁrms.
To see what happens to proﬁts as n changes, write proﬁts in (103) as
π = pq − C [q,L/n] − RL/n (123)
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The sign of (124) is ambiguous. Hence, under permit trading, proﬁts may rise or fall with an
increase in the number of ﬁrms. However, when p   ≥ 0, (124) is negative, so that in that case,
an increase in the number of ﬁrms always leads to a decrease in proﬁts. This is the case given
in the simulations and the results given in Tables 7-12 conﬁrm this outcome.
Credit trading. Diﬀerentiating (105), (87) and (88) totally with respect to n, we ﬁnd:
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45and (118) and (119). Deﬁne
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with Y> 0 given by (104). The numerator in (127) is positive by (59) and (61). The numerators
of (125) and (126) are ambiguous. Hence, as with permit trading, entry leads to higher industry
output. However, the eﬀect on ﬁrm output and the credit price is ambiguous.
Next, we want to know the eﬀect of a change in the number of ﬁrms on proﬁts per ﬁrm.
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The sign of the denominator is ambiguous. Hence, also under credit trading, proﬁts may rise
or fall with an increase in the number of ﬁrms. This result could imply that an increase in the
number of ﬁrms will lead to an increase in proﬁts. However, in the simulations given in section
3.2, it can be seen that an increase in the number of ﬁrms always leads to a decrease in proﬁts.
Combined Trading. We will not present the comparative statics for combined trading. The
reason is that the eﬀect of a change in n on both sectors simultaneously would have to be
evaluated. The result then is hard to derive and the outcome is likely to be ambiguous. However,
46Tables 7 to 12 show that when the number of ﬁrms increases, output and emissions per ﬁrm
decreases, as does the product price and the emissions quota price. For a decrease in the number
of ﬁrms, we observe the opposite. Note however that in Table 9, when the number of ﬁrms in
the credit sector drops from 4 to 3, the emissions quota price increases. This is probably caused
by the simultaneous increase in emission reductions. However, the simulations also show that
an increase in the number of ﬁrms always leads to a decrease in proﬁts, while the reverse holds
for a decrease in the number of ﬁrms.
C The Simulation Model
C.1 Perfect Competition
No Regulation. The situation without regulation is the starting point of the analysis and gives
a benchmark for the changes caused by regulation. Without regulation, proﬁts for a ﬁrm are
given by
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 − K
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p − 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (130)
∂π
∂E
=2 b(q − E)=0 ⇒ q = E (131)
Besides these conditions, in the long run there should be no proﬁts:
2aq +2 b(q − E)=
aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K
q









Denote by ˜ n the number of ﬁrms without taking the integer constraint into account. Now, ˜ n






The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is then given by the largest integer less or equal to ˜ n. Denote
the equilibrium values of ﬁrm output, product price and number of ﬁrms in the no-regulation
case by q0, p0 and n0 respectively.




The long-run proﬁt maximization problem for the ﬁrm is
max
q,E
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 − K − RpE
The ﬁrst order conditions are given by
∂π
∂q
= p − 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (132)
∂π
∂E
=2 b(q − E) − Rp = 0 (133)
Two further condition that need to hold in the long-run equilibrium are
nE = L (134)
2aq +2 b(q − E)=
aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K + Rp E
q
(135)




K ˜ n2(a + b) − abL 2
˜ n(a + b)
=
2bL+˜ nα
˜ n (2a +2b +˜ nβ)
The equilibrium n = n∗ is then found by rounding down to the nearest integer. Using n∗, q∗
can be found through
q =
2bL + nα
n(2a +2 b + nβ)
After this, the other variables can be found using (37) and (132)-(135).







With credit trading, the problem for the ﬁrm is
max
q,E
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 − K − Rc(E − ¯ eq)
The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂π
∂q
= p − 2aq − 2b(q − E)+Rc¯ e = 0 (136)
48∂π
∂E
=2 b(q − E) − Rc = 0 (137)
The other conditions that need to hold are that the industry emission ceiling is met and proﬁts
are zero, respectively:
nE = L (138)
2aq +2 b(q − E) − Rc¯ e =
aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K + Rc(E − ¯ eq)
q
(139)
In equilibrium, E = L/n, and no emissions trading will take place since all ﬁrms are identical.
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms ˜ n can be inferred from
4bL +˜ nα +

˜ n(˜ nα2 − 8bL(−α + Lβ)) − 16abL2




aK˜ n2(a + b) − abL2
(a + b)˜ n
Again, n∗ is found by rounding down to the nearest integer. As before, the system can be solved
numerically by inserting n∗ in the equation for q∗:
4bL+ nα+

n (nα 2 − 8bL(Lβ− α)) − 16abL 2
2n (2a +2b + nβ)
and then solving for the other variables using equations (136)-(139).
Combined Trading In the case of combined trading, the condition nE = L for both sectors
must be replaced by the following two conditions
ncEc + npEp =2 L (140)
Rp = Rc = R
The ﬁrst condition merely says that total emissions should be equal to total allowable emissions,
while the second condition states that the emission quota prices should be equalized between
the two markets.















Since trading with the permit sector is allowed, emissions E will in general be diﬀerent from ¯ eq.












aδ +( R − α)
√
4abδ + b((R − α)2 +4 LRβ)

where
δ =4 bK − R2
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms in both sectors is again found by rounding down. In the
simulation model, the number of ﬁrms is an integer, and therefore, ﬁrm output and emissions





nc (α − R)+

(ncR − ncα)
2 +4 LncR(2a + ncβ)
2nc (2a + ncβ)
Ep = qp −
R
2b
Ec = qc −
R
2b
The equations for np,n c,E p,E c are all functions of R. Inserting these equations in the emissions
constraint (140) gives an equation with only R unknown. This can then be solved and used to
solve for the other unknowns.
C.2 Imperfect Competition
No Regulation Assuming that all ﬁrms are identical, proﬁts are given by:
πi = p(Q)qi − aq2
i − b(qi − Ei)2 − K
where Q =
n
i=1 qi. Using the demand function (37), the ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂πi
∂qi
= α − βq(n +1 )− 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei)=0
∂πi
∂Ei
=2 b(qi − Ei)=0 ⇒ qi = Ei
50In the long run all ﬁrms in the market should at least cover their costs, i.e., πi ≥ 0 and entry
should not be proﬁtable. These conditions can be given as:
πi(n0) ≥ 0, and πi(n0 +1 )< 0
where n0 is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market without regulation. Denote by ˜ n the












The equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market, n0, is then given by the greatest integer less





Permit Trading The proﬁt function for the ﬁrm becomes:
π = p(Q)q − aq2 − b(q − E)2 − K − Rp(E − ¯ E)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= α − βq(n +1 )− 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (142)
∂π
∂E
=2 b(q − E) − Rp = 0 (143)
Since we have assumed that ﬁrms are identical, emissions after trading will be E = L/n.
Equilibrium output per ﬁrm follows from (142)
q =
2bL+ nα
n (2a +2b + β + nβ)
(144)
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms can be found by solving for q in the zero proﬁt condition and

















λ =4 b2L2,µ =4 bLαβ, and ν =2 a +2 b + β +˜ nβ
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is found by solving (145) for ˜ n and rounding down to the
nearest integer.
51Credit Trading With credit trading, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm become:
π = p(Q)q − aq2 − b(q − E)2 − K − RcE − ¯ eq)
where ¯ e = L/Q. The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q











=2 b(q − E) − Rc = 0 (147)
The equilibrium output can be found from (146)
q =






(−2bLn +4 bLn2 + n3α)
2 − 8bL2 (−1+n)n3 (ν)
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms can be be found by solving for q in the zero proﬁt condition































αβφ − 20b2L2β − 4bLβφ
˜ n3ν2 +
αφ +8 b2L2 +4 bL2β
˜ n3ν
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is found by solving this for ˜ n and rounding down to the nearest
integer.
Combined Trading Here we need the following conditions
2L = ncEc + npEp (149)
Rp = Rc = R
For the permit sector we can derive the following equations for output per ﬁrm and the number
of ﬁrms in the permit sector from (144), (143) and the zero proﬁt condition
qp =
−R + α
2a + β + np β
524bK − R2 +












η ≡ 2a + β +˜ npβ
This can be solved numerically. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms for every emission quota price
R is found by rounding the value for ˜ np down to the nearest integer.
Also under imperfect competition, the relative standard for the credit sector is now given by
L/nq. For output per ﬁrm in the credit sector, we ﬁnd from (146) and (147)
qc =








The number of ﬁrms in the credit sector can be derived from (150) and the zero proﬁt condition
4bK − R2 +

























Using these equations and the ﬁrst order condition for emissions, we can derive equations for np,
Ep, nc,a n dEc that are only functions of R. However, because the number of ﬁrms in each sector
is an integer, and the expressions above give a rational number, we cannot derive an expression
for the equilibrium value of R. Instead, the equilibrium value of R was found through iteration,
where the starting value of the iteration was Rp for every case and a small amount was added
until the equilibrium value was found.
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